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Executive	  Summary	  
The Government states that the measures in Digital Economy Act 2010 aimed at 
curtailing online infringement of copyright are “a fair and reasonable view of the 
expected costs, benefits and impact of the policy, and … that the benefits justify the 
costs”.1  In the light of our assessment of the issues we conclude that the measures under 
the Digital Economy Act 2010 are disproportionate. They are unlikely to result in long 
term benefit in line with the Government’s overall goal of balancing the interests of all 
those with aspirations for involvement in the digital economy in the UK. To be 
proportional, the Act would have to redress a clear problem with an effective 
intervention whose direct and indirect costs clearly are lower than the benefits delivered 
to society.  
 
Our assessment is that as a reliable means of curtailing copyright infringement or 
restoring the losses claimed by copyright holders, this Act provides for a social 
experiment, the outcome of which will disappoint expectations, including those of many 
Internet users, and damage the reputation and revenues of ISPs. The Act’s effectiveness 
and net benefits have not been established and, hence, it is disproportionate.  This 
assessment is based on the following logic.  The first step is that the Government’s 
impact assessments are flawed with respect to the methodology employed to estimate the 
impact on the costs to ISPs and their subscribers.  The second step is our observation 
that the scope of the Act reaches far beyond ISP subscribers to include many others who 
either use or provide access to Internet users.  The third step is that in the light of 
contradictory theoretical and empirical evidence on the relationship between 
interventions such as those required by the Act and behavioural change, the 
Government’s expectations with respect to the curtailment of online infringement of 
copyright are very unlikely to be met.  The fourth step is that the lives of citizens are 
changing fundamentally in the face of the new opportunities provided by an increasingly 
participatory culture of online sharing of all kinds of digital content, a generally positive 
and pro-innovation set of developments that will be disrupted by the Act.   
 
                                                
1 “It is important that the penalties available are proportionate to the harm caused to UK industries and 
that they act as an effective deterrent”, (UK Government, 2010b), p. 343. 
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These four main elements of our analysis lead us to the assessment that the provisions of 
the Act are disproportionate in that they do not achieve an appropriate balancing of the 
interests of rights holders and all others with an interest in a thriving digital economy. 
The steps in our logic and the conclusions we reach are based upon our examination of 
the empirical and theoretical evidence from the industry and academic literature and our 
experience in analysing the social and economic issues related to information and 
communication technologies (ICTs).  
 
We examine the impact of the Act on ISPs, their subscribers and others who use the 
Internet (Section 1); the losses suffered by rights holders and the impact of the Act on 
those losses (Section 2); the impact assessments of the Act (Section 3); and alternative 
approaches and the experience in other countries (Section 4).  
 
1.1	  General	  Impact	  of	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  Act	  2010	  
The Act’s impact on online infringement of copyright will be affected by a wide range of 
interacting factors that can be expected to influence the behaviour of citizens and 
consumers in the UK. Numerous studies of file-sharing provide contradictory evidence 
and a limited basis for generalising about the impact of these factors.  As a result, a 
reliable estimate of the decline in illegal file-sharing as a result of the Act cannot be made. 
The appropriate balance between benefits and costs of the Act should be considered 
within the context of innovative technology and social developments. The ‘online 
participatory’ or ‘remix’ culture offers potential for beneficial social and economic 
opportunities, especially when Internet users are encouraged to experiment with online 
applications. Claims to certainty about future developments are unfounded because of 
the rapid changes in the emerging online participatory culture.  The specific interventions 
under the Act have the potential to disrupt or alter the course of Internet development in 
ways that cannot be anticipated or assumed to be benign. 
 
1.2	  Impact	  on	  ISPs	  	  
The impact of the Act on ISPs will stem from the indirect effects on ISP reputations and 
customer demand for ISP services and the direct effects related to the costs of 
compliance. The consequences of misidentifications of infringing customers, negative 
effects on people who are not infringers and on organisations sponsoring Internet access 
have the potential to create reputational, and hence customer, loss for ISPs (1.2.1). The 
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inclusiveness of the Act and the unknown reliability and extent of the application of 
detection methods mean that the number of Copyright Infringement Reports (CIRs) and, 
hence, the costs of responding to them, is difficult to predict. The Act’s measures are 
targeted initially mainly at the fixed line network and fixed line ISPs will experience 
customer loss to other networks, raising issues about the fairness of competition in the 
UK ISP market that have not been considered (1.2.2).  
 
1.3	  Impact	  on	  Subscribers	  
The impact of the Act on subscribers will be considerable. Given the procedural 
complexities of the Act’s implementation, conflict and confusion may be generated as to 
the legal and illegal uses of P2P file-sharing. The approach does not consider adequately 
the dynamic and changing nature of the behaviours that the Act is intended to regulate 
(1.3.1). If subscribers have doubts about the legality of their use of the Internet or the 
likelihood of punishment, this is likely to reduce Internet use and the benefits citizens 
and consumers receive from such use. Subscribers will perceive monitoring of their 
behaviour as a loss of privacy and their efforts to preserve their privacy will create further 
implications for data protection. Cultural and social shifts in social networking on the 
Internet suggest that users’ perceptions of moral behaviour are changing. Children’s and 
adults’ abilities to use the Internet, and a growing gap between legal and user perspectives 
on what constitutes good online behaviour, will result in increasing confusion and fear 
(1.3.2). A response by subscribers to the perceived risks or threats of being charged with 
illegal file-sharing is that they will seek alternative means of avoiding detection and a 
greater volume of encrypted traffic between users may serve to increase security risks. IP 
blocking software can be used to avoid surveillance and possibly detection of copyright 
infringement. This suggests the existence of an ‘arms race’ between those seeking to 
identify infringing behaviour and those seeking to protect themselves from such 
surveillance activity (1.3.3). 
 
1.4	  Impact	  on	  Others	  Who	  Use	  the	  Internet	  
The Act makes every Internet subscriber liable to possible misuse of his or her Internet 
connection for copyright infringement. A single individual in a household may, by 
engaging in copyright infringing behaviour, affect others in the household. We estimate 
that, in households, as many as 15 million people who are not necessarily involved in 
infringement will face risks to their Internet use due to possible actions taken against 
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subscribers where infringement is alleged under the Act. Risks to others in the household 
include cancellations because of the reduced desirability of subscribing to Internet access, 
discontinuation of subscriptions after being threatened, and the use of the technical 
measures contemplated by the Act. Public institutions or access sites such as schools, 
libraries, museums, hospitals, universities and Internet cafés also will be threatened with 
possible misuse of the access they provide.  Access to the Internet will become more 
tightly regulated, resulting in a test of trust. The question of balance or proportionality 
with respect to the Act must be considered in the light of changes in the culture of 
Internet use, changing technologies, and the benefits and costs to all those concerned. 
 
2.0	  Losses	  Suffered	  by	  Rights	  Holders	  and	  the	  Impact	  of	  the	  Act	  
While we have little doubt that rights holders have lost revenue as the result of file-
sharing, we conclude that the existing evidence is insufficient to estimate the amount of 
these losses.  For any of these lost revenues to be restored, estimates of behavioural 
change connecting the curtailment of the exchange of infringing material with a return to 
market purchase of content, are required.  Studies from several disciplines indicate that 
changes in file-sharing behaviour in response to prosecution, threats of prosecution and 
other sanctions cannot be reliably predicted (2.1.2). The creative industries are adopting 
new strategies to meet the desires of users for digital content and these are evolving away 
from content that is subject to digital rights management (DRM) and other technical 
constraints on content copying.  New business models are being developed in order to 
generate revenue and some are proving to be successful. Rapid change in the creative 
industries mean that the Act’s anti-file-sharing provisions may not have the effects 
intended on user behaviour or on the evolution of new markets and business models for 
rights holders (2.1.3). 
 
Existing research provides evidence of both revenue losses and gains to rights holders 
from file-sharing specifically, and more generally, from digital content distribution.  The 
balance between these losses and gains appears to be fluctuating over time due to actions 
taken to suppress large-scale infringement activities, the entry of new online content 
merchants, and the increasing availability of content where rights holders do not seek to 
enforce copyright.  To our knowledge, there are no conclusive studies of the effects of 
these and other developments. Estimates of the impact of the Act on creative industries’ 
losses are inconclusive because investigations of ‘behavioural responses’ (how people 
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choose to act differently) in the face of interventions such as those required by the Act 
have yielded contradictory results.  In the light of rapidly changing social and cultural 
norms for online behaviour, and differences in reported experiences in different regions 
of the world, the behaviour of UK citizens and consumers in the future is, therefore, 
difficult to predict (2.1.4). 
 
Existing estimates of the Act’s effect on ‘revenue restoration’ rely upon surmise 
concerning behavioural change rather than on evidence that such change will occur and 
the methods used to derive evidence for these estimates appear to be flawed. It is also 
assumed that measures taken under the Act will be effective in foreclosing exchanges of 
infringing material, an assumption that does not appear to be warranted based upon 
historical and contemporaneous experience (2.2). 
 
3.0	  The	  Impact	  Assessments	  of	  the	  Act	  
Although rights holders have experienced a loss from file-sharing activity, there is very 
little basis in the methodology employed in the impact assessments on which to conclude 
that it amounts £400 million per year.  The assumptions employed to make this estimate 
contradict both common sense and economic analysis. In estimating the revenue 
restoration that would result from the Act it is assumed that the volume of file-sharing is 
reduced by 50 per cent based upon sending warning letters. It is then assumed that the 
total amount of this reduction provides a reliable estimate of the market purchases of 
content, i.e. that if an infringer were no longer able to illegally download content he or 
she would purchase the same content at prevailing market prices.  Maintaining this 
flawed estimate of revenue restoration for a decade, to yield a present value benefit to 
rights holders of £1.7 billion, not only extends the initial flaw in the estimate, but 
presumes that the ‘restored’ revenue of rights holders would persist in a context of rapid 
industry change (3.1). 
 
Against these estimates of rights holder benefits are the costs to ISPs and customers.  
The quantified cost impacts on ISPs of the Act are unreliable because the scope of the 
Act makes it unclear how many rights holders are likely to file CIRs, each of which will 
generate potential for reputational damage in addition to the costs of compliance 
estimated in the impact assessments (3.2). Dismissing any possible welfare loss from the 
Act to users by claiming that these losses will only be suffered by infringers is incorrect 
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as a matter of economic analysis.  It also fails to acknowledge or to estimate any of the 
collateral damage to those who are not infringers. Rather than presenting a clear case for 
intervention, the empirical evidence provides little solid ground for determining whether 
it is worth fighting illegal file-sharing in the manner proposed at all (3.3). The impact 
assessments offered prior to the Act reveal a strong bias in favour of rights holders over 
any other segment of society.  We note that some of these other costs are now being 
acknowledged (3.4). 
 
There are issues that should have been examined in the impact assessments but which we 
were unable to address in detail in this report.  These include an analysis of the 
competitive structure of the UK ISP industry and the impact of the changes; a full 
welfare analysis quantifying the welfare impact on consumers; a detailed consideration of 
privacy intrusions and the rights of citizens; and the impacts of technical restrictions that 
may be introduced to control user access to networks. We conclude that the full 
disruptive effects of the intervention called for by the Act have not been sufficiently 
examined in the impact assessments (3.5). 
 
4.0	  Alternative	  Approaches	  to	  Reducing	  Impacts	  of	  Online	  Infringement	  of	  
Copyright	  
There are alternative approaches that could be pursued to reduce the impact on online 
infringement of copyright.  These include pursuing those hosting or facilitating access to 
large amounts of infringing content; digital literacy campaigns; promotion of legal means 
for accessing content; attention to issues of market structure and competition; warning 
notifications to users of P2P software; and rethinking how digital content producers 
might be compensated for their efforts (4.1). The strategy of the UK Government is not 
one that is favoured throughout the EU or internationally. There is considerable 
variation in the approaches being adopted by governments, ISPs and the creative 
industries, and in the impact of measures to curtail infringing behaviour on Internet users. 
The trend in policy and legislation clearly is to ensure that copyright law is respected, but 
there is wide variation in the extent to which action is being targeted at individual users 
of the Internet, especially as the online participatory culture spreads and becomes more 
familiar and attractive to Internet users. Consumers and citizens are being subject to 
inconsistent conditions, rules, and procedures in different countries. In our opinion, 
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these inconsistencies are a source of confusion that is likely to retard innovation and 
impede the full potential offered by the use of the Internet (4.2).  
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1 Impact	  of	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  Act	  20101	  
This report examines the impact of the online infringement of copyright provisions of 
the Digital Economy Act 20102 generally, and in particular, on Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs), subscribers, and others who use the Internet. It considers the losses suffered by 
rights holders as a result of online infringement of copyright and the impact of the Act 
on those losses.  It considers the government’s impact assessments and the balancing of 
the benefits of the act to rights holders, ISPs and Internet users and provides a 
discussion of other ways in which the objective of reducing the impact of online 
infringement of copyright could be achieved, including how other countries approach the 
issue. 
 
1.1 General	  Impact	  of	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  Act	  2010	  
The impact of the online infringement of copyright provisions of the Act generally, in 
our assessment, will be affected by a wide range of interacting factors which can be 
expected to influence the behaviour of citizens and consumers in the UK. These factors 
include citizen and consumer perceptions of changing social and cultural norms and 
moral behaviour in the UK and overseas; their experience and skills (or literacy) in using 
the Internet; their varying demand for digital products of many kinds including music, 
films, and games as well as other forms of digital goods that can easily be accessed online; 
the changing supply structure of the creative industries and changes in the business 
models that are being introduced; perceptions of the proportionality of the Digital 
Economy Act 2010 and its implementation in the UK; and awareness of legislation of 
similar intent in the European Union (EU) and internationally.   
 
The impact of these factors on file-sharing is the subject of numerous academic studies 
and commissioned reports conducted by scholars and consultants, many of which 
employ social science research methods.  The results of these studies are contradictory 
and most provide only a very limited basis for generalizations concerning the expected 
                                                
1 This report was commissioned by BT Legal, British Telecommunications Plc, London.  The views 
expressed in this report are those solely of the authors and not those of any institution including our 
respective employers. 
2 (UK Government, 2010a). 
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behaviour of citizens and consumers and the likelihood that they will seek or use existing 
methods to acquire copyright protected online content. The great majority of such works 
acknowledge the limitations of their results due to the simplifying assumptions that are 
made and issues relating to data availability or data collection and sampling. In addition, 
most studies based on self-reported intentions to infringe copyright law or self-reported 
actual infringing behaviour acknowledge that social and cultural factors influence such 
self-reporting and that these need to be considered in interpreting results. Many of the 
studies in this area set out a future research agenda, 3 often concluding that there is no 
robust body of evidence upon which to base conclusions about the impact of the 
measures such as those in the UK Digital Economy Act 2010.  
 
In the impact assessment of the Act, the necessity for government intervention is stated 
as follows: 
“Government intervention is being proposed to address the rise in online infringement of 
copyright which might reduce the incentive for the creative industries to invest in the development, 
production and distribution of new content. Implementation of the proposed policy would allow 
rights holders to better appropriate the returns on their investment”. (emphasis added)4 
 
The policy objective is summarised as follows:  
“The policy objective is to make sure that investment in content is at socially appropriate levels by 
allowing investors to obtain fully appropriate returns on their investment”.5 
 
The Government’s own impact assessment acknowledges that it ‘might’ have the impact 
of ensuring investment in digital content at ‘socially appropriate levels’.  No clear logic is 
presented in the impact assessment reports concerning what might be a ‘socially 
appropriate level’ other than the presumptions that file-sharing has reduced the revenues 
of rights holders and that rights holders therefore are constrained in making investment 
in the development, production and distribution of new content. 
 
The main effect envisaged as a result of the implementation of the Act is a decline in the 
downloading of copyright infringing content as a result of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing.  
A basic definition of file-sharing is: 
 “The making available of files from a user’s own computer for copying and transmission to other 
users over the Internet, and the receipt of files made available this way.  File sharing thus involves 
uploading as well as downloading.  File sharing takes place in networks of users.  Third parties have 
developed the file-sharing services and technologies to connect users and enable them to carry out 
                                                
3 See for example, (Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy, 2010). 
4 (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, et al., 2010a), p.54. 
5 (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, et al., 2010a), p.54. 
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such transmission and copying activities in the third party’s particular ‘peer-to-peer’ (P2P) 
network”.6 
 
File-sharing, whether involving legal or infringing behaviour, is one of many possibilities 
made available by the spread of the Internet and its applications. The 2006 Gowers 
Report on Intellectual Property said that achieving a balance among the interests of the 
creative industry and citizens and consumers, “is made more difficult by the vocabulary 
used to discuss IP policy and practice. Copyright infringement through unauthorised 
copying and distribution of music and video across the Internet is likened to stealing by 
some, and to sharing by others”.7  “If IP rights are balanced, coherent and flexible, the 
system will support greater investment in R&D and will allow the access to knowledge 
that will stimulate future innovation”.8  The issue of the balance of the Act’s impacts on 
interested parties, including the creative industry content producers, ISPs, and 
subscribers and other users of online services, is central to our assessment of the 
proportionality of the measures mandated by the Act and in the Draft Initial Obligations 
Code developed by Ofcom.9  
 
In our view, the question of balance must be considered within the wider context of 
innovative developments in information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
(including the Internet) over the past several decades and changing expectations on the 
part of citizens and consumers about their capacities to produce and consume digital 
products in the information society or digital economy. The development of these 
capacities touches upon a wide variety of policy concerns including education, political 
participation, social status, and economic sustainability.  These concerns go beyond the 
issue of copyright protection and the incentives for innovation in the copyright industries.  
For example, as early as 1986 a report by the US Office of Technology Assessment on 
Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and Information stated that in the economic, 
social and political realms,  
 “the stakes in the intellectual property debate are rising as fast as the technologies are becoming 
more technically sophisticated and widely used. …intellectual property policy can no longer be 
separated from other policy concerns. … decisions about intellectual property law may be decisions 
about the distribution of wealth and social status”.10  
 
                                                
6 (Dixon, 2009), p. 13-14. 
7 (HM Treasury, 2006), para. 1.9. 
8 (HM Treasury, 2006), para 1.45. 
9 (Ofcom, 2010). 
10 (Office of Technology Assessment, 1986), p. 11, 14. 
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Jenkins, a respected US scholar of developments in new ICTs argues that Internet users 
and many new entrant companies, as well as some of the incumbents in the creative 
industries, are “experimenting with new approaches that see fans as important 
collaborators in the production of content and as grassroots intermediaries … We will 
call them collaborationists”.11  In 2010 in the UK we have an increasingly online 
participatory culture which should be valued and encouraged because, as Jenkins writes: 
 “A growing body of scholarship suggests potential benefits from these forms of participatory 
culture, including opportunities for peer-to-peer learning, a changed attitude toward intellectual 
property, the diversification of cultural expression, the development of skills valued in the 
modern workplace, and a more empowered conception of citizenship.  Access to this 
participatory culture functions as a new form of hidden curriculum, shaping which youths will 
succeed and which will be left behind as they enter school and the workplace”.12 
 
The online participatory culture is also called a ‘remix culture’. Lessig, a contributor to 
legal and policy debates in the US on copyright extension and enforcement, argues that 
in a ‘remix’ culture, amateur creativity becomes a substantial resource for the economy 
and society. He asks: “What should we do if we know that the future will be one where 
our kids, and their kids, will use a digital network to access whatever content they want 
whenever they want it?  What should we do if we know that the future is one where 
perfect control over the distribution of ‘copies’ simply will not exist?”13 Benkler, another 
US scholar, argues that the sharing of digital information is central to the emergence of a 
new form of economic production which he suggests eventually will transform the 
economy to emphasise open access to all forms of digital content.14  David, a scholar of 
the economics of technological innovation and the history of copyright, argues that the 
extension and enforcement of copyright has unanticipated effects including that of 
shaping the digital content that will become most easily accessible to users in areas 
beyond the entertainment industry, with as yet unknown effects on access to various 
repositories of knowledge.15   
 
Our assessment of developments in ICTs and the Internet in 2000 indicated that there is 
great potential for new beneficial social and economic opportunities for citizens and 
consumers when they are facilitated in building the capabilities for doing so and when 
                                                
11 (Jenkins, 2006), p. 134. 
12 (Jenkins, et al., 2009), p. xii. 
13 (Lessig, 2008), p. xviii.  
14 (Benkler, 2004). 
15 (David & Rubin, 2008). 
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they are encouraged to experiment with the applications offered by the Internet.16  
Whether such potential will be captured is substantially influenced by the policies and 
legislation adopted by governments and by the practices of citizens and consumers, an 
observation confirmed by comprehensive assessments of developments in the 
application of ICTs and the spread of the Internet within the UK, the EU, and globally.17  
 
Claims about the way the digital economy is developing and the respective social, 
political and economic interests of producers and consumers of digital content are the 
subject of competing explanations. The existing empirical evidence demonstrates that a 
key certainty is that surprising and unexpected outcomes will result from the interactions 
among multiple factors that influence change.  In some cases, theories and models 
developed in an era before the ubiquitous availability of relatively low cost access to the 
Internet are applied taking little account of the availability of free or low cost software 
for creating and exchanging content within networks that are not limited by the 
boundaries of nation states. Our assessment is that claims to certainty in this area are 
unfounded with respect to the direction of the changing social norms and changes in 
citizen and consumer behaviour as a highly interactive online participatory culture takes 
hold. The specific interventions that will be implemented under the Act have the 
potential to disrupt or alter the course of Internet development in ways that cannot be 
anticipated or assumed to be benign. This conclusion is based on our analysis of the 
impacts of the Act on each of the groups considered in this section.  
 
Our assessment of the impact of the online infringement of copyright provisions of the 
Act is provided in the following sections starting with ISPs (1.2), followed by subscribers 
(1.3) and others who use the Internet (1.4). 
 
1.2 Impact	  on	  ISPs	  
The impact of the Act on ISPs will stem from a combination of factors including the 
indirect effects of the Act on ISP reputations and customer goodwill and demand for ISP 
services and the direct effects related to the costs of compliance. 
 
                                                
16 (Mansell & Steinmueller, 2000b). 
17 (Mansell, et al., 2007; Mansell & Raboy, 2010 in press) and see (Noam & Pupillo, 2008). 
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1.2.1 Reputational	  Costs	  for	  ISPs	  
The reputational costs to ISPs (indirect effects) and damage to customer goodwill and 
demand will result from several effects. 
 
First, rights holders must be able to identify infringing behaviour of users with a high 
degree of accuracy as these claims of infringement are passed on to ISPs that risk losing 
the trust of their subscribers. Reputational costs to ISPs are likely to be incurred as a 
result of ‘false positives’ in detecting copyright infringement by the rights holders. False 
positive results will result in customer dissatisfaction and losses of customers.  
 
While it is not within our expertise to evaluate technical claims concerning the 
performance of any specific method of detecting copyright infringement, the history of 
developments in this field is consistent -- false positive are consistently achieved.  False 
positives are identifications of copyright infringement that prove to be groundless.  It is 
reported that Cox, Time Warner Cable and Comcast have created a joint venture called 
PolyCipher which is funding research into a project called BitStalker. The aim is to help 
copyright holders more effectively identify BitTorrent users who are trading copyrighted 
files by reducing the number of false positives (said to be at least about 11 per cent) that 
occur during efforts to identify infringers on P2P networks.18 There are many instances 
in other areas, such as the use of biometrics to verify identity, where studies have shown 
that people react negatively to charges which prove to be the result of false positive 
identification.19 The possibility of false positives resulting in notification of customers of 
claimed copyright infringement would result in reputational costs to ISPs.  These were 
not estimated in the consultation process leading to the Act. There already have been 
claims to this effect in the UK as a result of letters sent to some ISP customers prior to 
the enactment of the Act.20 On the basis of the information available to us, it is not 
feasible to quantify the potential loss of customers as a result of false positive 
identifications. 
 
It is likely that some customers will elect to use privacy-enhancing technologies to 
protect their anonymity, increasing that risk that ISPs will be unable to detect many 
potential infringers. There are many privacy-enhancing technologies from which users 
                                                
18 (Bode, 2010). 
19 (Sasse, 2005). 
20 (Enigmax, 2008). 
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can choose including snoop-proof email programmes, anonymous remailers, anonymous 
web-browsing tools, html filters, cookie busters, and web encryption tools. We do not 
claim technical expertise in this area but all of these provide options for file sharers who 
seek to maintain their anonymity,21 making detection difficult. While some methods used 
for detecting copy infringement are increasingly sophisticated, it is unknown what range 
of practices might be employed where there is a large number of possible claimants of 
copyright infringement, each capable of using their own techniques for ‘detecting’ 
infringement.  Further discussion of this issue occurs at Section 1.3.3 which considers 
efforts to avoid detection. 
 
The technical feasibility of creating methods for overcoming copyright infringement 
detection or for misdirecting assignment of infringing behaviour to other non-infringing 
users resulting in mistaken notifications being sent to misidentified users, was not 
explicitly acknowledged in the impact assessments of the Act.  The consequences of loss 
of ISP reputation or customers also were not assessed.   
 
Second, it is likely that ISPs will suffer reputation costs as a result of the negative effects 
on people who are not infringers and organisations sponsoring Internet access that are 
affected by actions taken against alleged infringers. There is a risk that many household 
customers will be notified who are unaware: a) of others in the household who may be 
committing infringing acts, b) of others who are visiting the household who gain access 
to a customer’s account, c) of individuals who gain access to the ISP via WiFi or other 
means of communicating through local area networks,22 (estimates of the number of 
people affected are provided in Section 1.4). These customers might be displeased to 
receive notices from ISPs and may choose to terminate their service rather than risk re-
occurrence of the implicit threat, resulting in a loss of revenue to the ISP. We are not in a 
position at this time to estimate the size of this loss due to the unique and large scale of 
the potential effects of the Act on these customers. 
	  
Third, there are risks to ISP customers that are not households stemming from the 
individual behaviour of users of their Internet connections. Schools, libraries, and other 
public organisations as well as businesses and users in the third sector (charities and 
                                                
21 (Bennett & Raab, 2003). 
22 (Hampton & Gupta, 2008) and (Lindner, et al., 2004). 
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other not-for-profit organisations) will need systems to track and ‘log’ individual users’ 
Internet connections or to disable the usual means of employing the Internet, e.g. to 
prevent the possibility of saving information (estimates of the number of users affected 
by these issues are provided in Section 1.4). The costs of implementing these systems, 
monitoring their use, and taking measures to counter their misuse will be borne by these 
organisations. This will have an impact on the demand for ISP services and revenues. It 
also will have consequences for other public purposes associated with the public 
availability of Internet connection.  We are not in a position at this time to estimate the 
size of these effects other than indicating the numbers of users who are likely to be 
affected. 
 
1.2.2 Costs	  of	  ISP	  Compliance	  
Estimates of the costs of ISP compliance with the Act, that is, the direct effects, are 
unreliable for several reasons. 
 
First, the potential inclusiveness of the Act makes it extremely difficult to predict the 
number of CIRs (Copyright Infringement Reports) that is likely to be generated. The 
unknown number and variety of types of content over which rights holders may claim 
copyright protection and the possibility that the emerging online participatory culture will 
foster a greater variety of ISP subscriber sharing behaviours, make estimates of the 
number of CIRs likely to be generated an exercise in speculation.  The impact 
assessments rely on a study by Mott MacDonald. 23 Only the direct costs of compliance 
are examined in this study which relies on a limited set of assumptions to reach its cost 
range conclusions and provides a basis only for guessing what the numbers of CIRs will 
be. The implied model is that only P2P file-sharing is to be the subject of CIRs.  
However, the wording of the Act opens the CIR mechanism to all those who hold 
copyright in photographs, texts, ‘blueprints’, musical scores, cross-stitch patterns, etc. 
The Government asserts that “File sharing of audio, video, data, or anything in digital 
format between users on a computer network has increased significantly in the last few 
years”, indicating the potentially inclusive reach of the Act.24 Moreover, the Authors’ 
Licensing and Collecting Society (ALCS) indicated in its submission to the consultation 
on the legislation that “Our concern is that, in allocating dedicated resources to this 
                                                
23 (Mott MacDonald, 2010). 
24 (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, et al., 2010b), pp. 18, 19. 
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project, there may be a tendency to focus on the ‘higher-end’ offenders, leaving a 
significant proportion of more routine infringements untouched”. 25 This statement 
suggests that the scope for the pursuit of copyright infringement could be very broad.   
 
In attempting to assess the costs of the Act, the apparent aim was to maximise certainty 
about the costs for all industry stakeholders. This requires robust prediction of the level 
of CIRs that is likely to be generated which, in turn, requires a high level of certainty in 
the modelling of the cost elements. The Mott MacDonald report emphasises the 
sensitivity of the charging algorithm: “the charging algorithm is extremely important and 
will have a major impact on the effectiveness of the scheme. The reason is that the 
effectiveness will depend to a large extent on the volume of CIRs/notifications per year 
requested…”26.  As there is no discussion about the impact of assumptions alternative to 
those made by Mott MacDonald, we have little basis for assessing the magnitude of the 
impact of alternative scenarios on ISPs. However, costs would increase with a larger 
number of CIRs. 
 
Second, there are potential costs associated with the lack of clarity with respect to the 
scope of the measures. The measures appear to be aimed most directly at P2P file-
sharing. They are targeted at the fixed line network initially, although BT’s wireless 
network may also be included since it operates a large wireless network. To the extent 
that users perceive that other networks offer lower risks of being accused of copyright 
infringement, fixed line network ISP providers will experience customer loss to other 
networks.  There are reports in the trade press about the discontinuation of ‘unlimited’ 
mobile data contracts announced by O2 and Vodafone in response to a tiny number of 
users who are downloading large amounts of data. Users engaged in large-scale 
downloading may already be connecting to mobile networks to work around ‘fair use’ 
restrictions on wired connections. 27  In addition, since ISPs also serve as Internet-based 
intermediaries customer dissatisfaction towards them may be extended to hosting 
services and search engines, 28 creating additional reasons for dissatisfaction.  Customers 
may switch to other suppliers not included in the initial implementation of the Act.  This 
raises questions about competition in the ISP market and whether there is a ‘level playing 
                                                
25 (Authors' Licensing and Collecting Society (ALCS), 2010), p. 4. 
26 (Mott MacDonald, 2010), p. 26. 
27 (Arthur, 2010). 
28 (Strowel, 2009). 
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field’ for all ISPs in the UK market. We are not in a position at this time to assess the 
magnitude of these effects. 
 
1.3 Impact	  on	  Subscribers	  
The impact of the online infringement of copyright provisions of the Act on subscribers 
is considerable given the confusion experienced by subscribers as to what constitutes 
legal and illegal use of P2P file-sharing, the procedures being adopted by different ISPs 
and whether alternative strategies for acquiring online digital content constitute user 
misbehaviour. 
 
1.3.1 Changing	  Online	  Behaviours	  
In line with the Act, the Ofcom Draft Initial Obligations Code is expected to balance 
legitimate uses and freedom of expression against the costs of implementing technical 
sanctions authorised by the courts.  However, the establishment of a threshold for 
determining “who is a relevant subscriber who may be the subject of a copyright 
infringement list that the ISP provides to a copyright owner” is unlikely to be clear to 
subscribers. Although the threshold could be set by reference to any matter, “including 
the number of CIRs made”,29 this is the method selected. The explanatory notes to the 
Act state that before approaching the courts to implement technical sanctions against 
copyright infringers “the Secretary of State must be satisfied that online copyright 
infringement is having a serious adverse effect on businesses or consumers and that 
making regulations would be a proportionate way to address that effect … They must 
also require the court to consider the effect on legitimate uses or users of the online 
location and the importance of freedom of expression”.30 The Ofcom Draft Code 
indicates that where there is discretion “the interests of citizens and consumers are 
central”. Any appeals of allegations against ISP subscribers must include a right to 
anonymity and allegations must be based upon credible evidence.31 In our assessment, 
the procedural complexities of implementation will lead to confusion on the part of 
subscribers. The approach described in the Ofcom Draft Code does not consider 
adequately the dynamic and changing nature of the behaviours that the Act is intended to 
regulate. 
                                                
29 (UK Government, 2010b), para. 44. 
30 (UK Government, 2010b), paras. 81, 83. 
31 (Ofcom, 2010), para 1.3. 
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1.3.2 Reduced	  Benefits	  of	  Internet	  Use	  
If subscribers are confused about the legality of their use of the Internet or the likelihood 
of punishment this is likely to have the effect of reducing Internet use and the benefits 
citizens and consumers receive from such use. This confusion is likely to reduce some 
users’ willingness to experiment in using Internet services and functionalities.  This runs 
counter to the Government’s aim of encouraging innovative and inclusive participation 
in the digital economy in the UK.  Surveys conducted by the Oxford Internet Institute 
(OII) suggest that there is an ‘experience curve’ in Internet use that results in varying 
levels of trust in the Internet at different levels of experience.32  Experimentation is a key 
element in the learning process that leads to creative and rewarding uses of the Internet.33 
This has been demonstrated empirically in cases where Internet users become co-creators 
of content and then seek to share the results of their work.34 The ethos of online sharing 
is one that needs to be fostered if the full benefits of the digital economy are to become 
available to UK citizens and consumers. 
 
Subscribers will perceive that their online behaviour is being monitored and experience a 
loss of privacy in their use of the Internet.  This may negatively affect their willingness to 
use the Internet and thus reduce the benefits that might otherwise accrue from such use. 
There is a large literature on the issue of trust in the Internet which suggests that trust in 
technology is very easy to lose and very difficult to rebuild.35 Studies of surveillance 
online and offline find that citizens and consumers behave in different ways depending 
on the culture, their socio-economic income group, the political context and their 
intentions.36 Surveillance and monitoring and the effect these have on human values, 
relationships and daily practices have been studied, with findings, for example, that 
increased surveillance often involves disproportionate interference with privacy, data 
protection and democratic principle and practice, and can enhance Internet users’ efforts 
                                                
32 (Dutton & Shepherd, 2005) research on trust and the Internet suggests that users’ perceptions of 
different types of online behaviour varies with their experiences online, an argument that could be 
extended to experiences associated with online file-sharing. 
33 (Jenkins, et al., 2009). 
34 (Van Der Graaf, 2009). 
35 (Mansell & Collins, 2005). 
36 (Lyon, 2007). 
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to find alternative ways of obtaining the types of digital content that they value which 
they may believe to be either legal or illegal.37 
 
The monitoring of online behaviour is associated with changing social mores with 
respect to the protection of personal privacy and data protection.  Surveys indicate that 
the erosion of information privacy as a result of manipulation of information on the 
Internet is seen as regrettable by large portions of respondents.38 In the field of privacy 
protection, where strong forms of legal enforcement have been employed, enforceability 
instruments have been found to operate in complex and contingent ways “to the extent 
that it is impossible to draw a uni-dimensional continuum from weak to strong 
enforcement and to place each of the instruments at some specified and stable point”.39 
 
The Ofcom Draft Code notes that while “this document focuses on the Code of practice, 
we note that its measures were always expected to be complemented by a wider set of 
activity on online copyright infringement including consumer education, the promotion 
of lawful alternative services and targeted legal action against serious infringers”.40 
 
As the technological environment offers an increasing array of personalised, networked, 
convergent and mobile media products and services, it is known that the social 
environment is changing the contexts of use. Digital and online media are becoming 
more integral to all spheres of life, blurring the boundaries of home and school, and the 
public and private spheres.41   
 “As technologies, digital forms and spaces of mediation converge, we are witnessing the blurring of 
hitherto distinctive social practices of information and entertainment, work and leisure, public and 
private, national and global, even childhood and adult”.42   
 
These developments mean that Internet users’ abilities to understand social and legal 
norms about legal and illegal uses of the Internet cannot be taken for granted.  
Livingstone’s work on young people’s use of digital technologies indicates that “use 
depends on the abilities to access, analyse, evaluate and create and each of these is, 
further, part of a dynamic and mutually supporting process of engagement and 
                                                
37 (Brown & Korff, 2009) and (Brown, 2009). 
38 (Raab, 2005). 
39 (Bennett & Raab, 2003), p. 169. 
40 (Ofcom, 2010), para 1.9. 
41 (Livingstone, 2010). 
42 (Livingstone, 2009), p. 181. 
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learning”.43  Children and adults vary considerably with respect to their abilities to use the 
Internet. There is uneven understanding of systems for selection, control of user 
protection or even how content is produced, disseminated, financed or regulated.   
 
Numerous education initiatives are underway to fill this knowledge deficit,44 but most are 
directed at whole populations, tending to reach those who have the strongest abilities, 
rather than those who have the least knowledge and experience.45  There is no evidence 
that such initiatives to educate in this way have positive effects. Such initiatives may have 
counter-intuitive effects and, even where they are found to work, the knowledge acquired 
may not be used in ‘real-life’ circumstances. Policy makers are seeking to promote the use 
of the Internet through online education, participation, and creativity, but it is not clear 
what specific interventions are needed.  There is an emerging consensus in the UK that 
“maximizing opportunities while minimizing risks is a task for multiple stakeholders”, 
but it is not yet apparent specifically what new forms of expertise are needed.46  This 
observation applies as much to file-sharing behaviour as it does to other kinds of 
information search behaviour using the Internet. 
 
There is also evidence of a growing gap between legal and user perspectives on what 
constitutes good online behaviour. 47   Moral reasoning and involvement in current 
fashions have been found to influence Internet user behaviour.48 In addition, new 
approaches to online education are making use of file-sharing in order to offer students 
access to a wealth of digital content,49 augmenting the impression that the use of P2P 
software is always legal.  These developments are likely to send conflicting signals to 
younger and older Internet users about the appropriate norms that should govern their 
file-sharing behaviour and contribute to confusion about acceptable and unacceptable 
online behaviour on the part of ISP subscribers. If the strategy is to limit the use of P2P 
software in order to send consistent signals to users, the perceived value of Internet use 
could decline.  
 
                                                
43 (Livingstone, 2009), p. 186. 
44 Such as those discussed at the elearningeuropa.info site 
http://www.elearningeuropa.info/directory/index.php?page=doc&doc_id=4935&doclng=6. 
45 (Livingstone, 2009). 
46 (Livingstone, in press), np. 
47 (Pouwelse, et al., 2008). 
48 (Chen, et al., 2008). 
49 (T. Anderson, 2009). 
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Users also obtain value from the use of P2P distribution methods because they are a 
source of content for MP3 players.  The value of the use of such devices will be 
diminished if the measures to reduce copyright infringement are effective, although a 
balanced approach is important if the producers of these players depend on 
infringements for their value. It is claimed, for example, that the users participating in 
‘bootleg’ (unauthorized recordings) sharing communities “care deeply about the music 
they share, go to great pains only to work with materials which are not officially available, 
and are driven by loyalty and enthusiasm for the artists whose bootlegs they share, rather 
than by a desire to harm them”.50  Although distinctions are drawn in the literature 
between open source software communities and communities of file-sharers, the 
voluntary and altruistic ethos that often typifies both is indicative of the cultural and 
social shifts that characterize the broader phenomenon of social networking based on the 
Internet.51  For instance, it has been suggested that participants involved in both 
restoring and sharing recordings engage in a form of content curation, not unlike 
museum and archive curators who are charged with preserving the cultural record for 
their field of interest. 52 
 
1.3.3 Avoiding	  Detection	  
A response by subscribers to the perceived risks of the threat of charges of illegal file-
sharing is that they will seek alternative means of avoiding detection.  
 
The social scientific literature on the perception of risk on the part of users of ICTs and 
the Internet indicates that “different individuals and different communities might judge a 
risk more or less seriously because they value the consequences differently – they value 
differentially what is being harmed and who is doing the harm”. 53  Such evaluations are 
political, aesthetic and moral matters. There is evidence that people’s actual behaviour 
frequently departs from the predictions of rational choice theory. It is known that 
laypersons respond to perceived risks, such as the threat of punishment or 
embarrassment, “based on common patterns for interpreting events, which are heavily 
influenced by the media”.54  
                                                
50 (Bruns, 2010), p. 9. 
51 (Berdou, 2007). 
52 (Bruns, 2010), p. 9. 
53 (Jackson, et al., 2005), p. 247. 
54 (Jackson, et al., 2005), citing Wiedemann, p. 271. 
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By reducing the value of sharing practices, this may create other social risks, e.g. a greater 
volume of encrypted traffic between users may serve to increase security risks. There are 
reports in the trade press that since the passage of the Swedish Anti-Piracy Law there is 
greater interest in encrypting Internet traffic and a growth in trade for businesses that 
provide encrypted virtual private network services.55 
 
There is also evidence of an evolving effort by users to protect themselves from 
surveillance by infringement detection organisations.  One strategy of these organisations 
appears to be entry into P2P networks in order to monitor user file exchange activity.  In 
response, groups of individuals have devised ‘filters’ to block access from particular IP 
sites – denying these sites access to inter-computer communication including P2P file-
sharing. 
 
A study by Banerjee et al.56 revealed that ordinary or ‘unshielded’ P2P exchange inevitably 
would disclose a user’s IP address to one of the sites blocked by lists maintained by 
groups such as I-Blocklist.57  Lists of blocked sites are designed to protect users from 
invasions of their privacy, sources of spyware or malicious software, or from government 
or company monitoring of their activities.  We note that the first of the lists indexed by I-
Blocklist, which is available for an annual subscription of 8€, is named ‘Anti-
Infringement’.  This indicates to us that a significant use of IP blocking software involves 
attempts to avoid detection of copyright infringement or fear of monitoring by 
organisations that have taken legal actions against those accused of sharing copyright 
infringing files.  We are unsure about the extent of user awareness of such monitoring, 
but note that a group developing open source software, PeerBlock, for the purposes of 
P2P blocking uses lists such those produced by I-Blocklist and reports 250,000 
downloads of their software as of mid-December 2009.58 
 
The IP addresses used by organisations to monitor P2P networks are subject of course to 
change as are the contents of the lists of blocked sites posted by users. A similar issue is 
the effort to disguise IP addresses for the use of BitTorrent.  While one source indicates 
                                                
55 (Techdirt, 2009b). 
56 (Banerjee, et al., 2008). 
57 See http://www.iblocklist.com/, accessed 1/07/2010. 
58 See http://www.peerblock.com/news, accessed 1/07/2010. 
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that it is possible currently to detect IP addresses associated with specific newly uploaded 
files, it also indicates ways in which practices of uploaders and downloaders might be 
changed to make such identification more difficult or impossible.59  These accounts 
suggest the existence of an ‘arms race’ between those seeking to identify infringing 
behaviour and those seeking to protect themselves from such surveillance activity.60 
 
1.4 Impact	  on	  Others	  Who	  Use	  the	  Internet	  
The Act makes every Internet subscriber liable for possible misuse of his or her Internet 
connection for copyright infringement.  What does this mean in practice?  Current 
methods of accessing the Internet are varied.  Almost all individuals who access the 
Internet do so at home (95% in 2009), which statisticians refer to as households.61  
 
The issue that is raised by the Act for households is that a single individual in the 
household may, through engaging in copyright infringing behaviour, affect others in the 
household.  How many people are potentially involved?  Using Office for National 
Statistics on household composition in the UK, we find that as many as 15 million 
individuals may be at risk if there is a single infringer in the household.62  The Internet 
access of these individuals is at risk for several reasons – doubts about what constitutes 
legal and illegal online behaviour engendered by the Act may reduce the desirability of 
subscribing to Internet access, the subscriber may choose to discontinue a subscription 
after being threatened, or further technical measures contemplated by the Act may affect 
his or her use. 
 
The home is not the only place of Internet access.  Each point of access is likely to 
involve an ISP subscription and a subscriber who will be concerned about possible 
                                                
59 (Le Blond, et al., 2010). 
60 The point about an ‘arms race’ is further developed by (Collins & Mansell, 2005) and (Ekblom, 2005). 
61 As in other countries, the UK has many different types of households.  Although some households may 
have more than one Internet connection, this is unusual because of the use of Internet routers with 
wireless and wired connections for sharing a single subscription.  In the estimates here, we assume a 
single ISP subscription per household.  The estimate of the share of users who access the Internet at 
home is from (Dutton, et al., 2009), p. 9. 
62 This estimate is based on applying the average household Internet subscription rate (61.5%) to all 
households with two or more people in them, counting the number of people in the household other 
than a single assumed ‘infringer’, applying to all household members the OII estimate that 70 per cent 
of all adults (14 years of age and older) are Internet users (Dutton, et al., 2009), p. 7 and subtracting an 
estimate of the number of children under the age of 5 from the European standard population age 
structure (Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2009), pp. 14, 232. As stated in the text, ‘as many as’ 
refers to uncertainties concerning younger children’s usage of the Internet and other possible 
refinements that might affect the estimate. 
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misuse of his or her connection and the resulting threats and possible sanctions.  This is 
likely to lead to a variety of responses:  denying access, requiring users to assume liability 
and closely monitoring access, or purchasing an insurance policy to protect against 
misuse.  Some of these responses will raise costs; others will erode trust between people.  
None of these impacts was acknowledged or quantified in the impact statements 
prepared for the Act.  How large is the scale of these potential impacts? 
 
In the sample selected by the OII for its 2009 survey, some 41 per cent of users access 
the Internet at work.63  In the UK, 29.3 million people were employed full or part-time in 
2008.64  OII estimates that 70 per cent of adults are current Internet users.  Thus, a 
reasonable estimate of the number of people using the Internet at work is 12.5 million.65  
While many places of employment may record Internet use by employees systematically, 
the Act now will make them liable for the possible misuse of every Internet connection 
at all times.  It is reasonable to predict that this liability will have a chilling effect on the 
freedom and ease with which people make use of the Internet in the workplace. 
 
People also use the Internet in many other places.  In each of these places, the subscriber 
to the Internet connection will face the liability associated with the misuse of a computer.  
For example, according to the OII, 35 per cent of Internet users report accessing the 
Internet from someone else’s home.  This may mean that over 10 million people are, at least 
occasionally, using the Internet from someone else’s home.66 Some of these 10 million 
users will represent a liability for the person allowing someone else’s use of his or her 
Internet connection.  Again, it is reasonable to predict that this will have a chilling effect 
on the willingness of individuals to allow their friends or household guests to use their 
Internet connections. 
 
                                                
63 (Dutton, et al., 2009), p. 9 
64 (Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2009), p. 52. 
65 This estimate is based on the 29.3 million people employed multiplied by 70 per cent of adults who are 
current users, which equals 20.5 million employed people who use the Internet.  Then, the 20.5 million 
users who are employed multiplied by 41 per cent of users who use the Internet at work, yields the 12.5 
million reported. 
66 Some 35 per cent of users between the ages of 15 and 75, estimated as 70 per cent of the population of 
this age group (46 million multiplied by 70 per cent is 32 million) and recognising that those aged from 
60 to 75 are less likely to be users, but that children under the age of 15 are likely to be both Internet 
users and using the Internet at the homes of friends.  The estimate is based on 35 per cent of 32 million 
(11 million). 
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These impacts also will be felt by public institutions such as schools, libraries, museums, 
hospitals and universities.  For example, the OII found that 16 per cent of those aged 14 
and over use the Internet at school or university (over 7 million people) and 14 per cent 
(over 6 million people) access the Internet from libraries.67  These are large numbers of 
users who might previously have enjoyed access without the need to prove their identity 
or risk that a friend or other person might gain access in their name and misuse their 
access privileges.  All of these sites as well as others such as Internet cafés (with over 3 
million people accessing the Internet)68 will be threatened with possible misuse of the 
access they provide as a public service or as the basis for their business or mission.  In 
each environment, access to the Internet will become more tightly regulated, subject to 
suspicion and involve a test of trust.  
 
In addition, users of the Internet who do not subscribe to ISPs participating in the initial 
phases of implementation may find their access curtailed, also becoming confused about 
the legality or illegality of their file-sharing behaviour. Ofcom claims that, initially, the 
Government anticipates that most small and medium-sized ISPs and mobile network 
operators will fall outside the cut-off point during the initial implementation of the 
scheme.69 For ISPs, especially those whose business models would be severely affected 
by the cost of implementing the obligations, and that are not initially subject to the Code, 
Ofcom suggests that they “may wish to consider whether they can reduce or avoid the 
possibility of being brought within the scope of the scheme by controlling the incidence 
of infringement on their networks”.70 Any such actions taken by these ISPs and wireless 
network providers may lead to curtailment of the legal uses by those who use the 
Internet in public places, for example, using WiFi networks. User registration 
requirements might be introduced that would reveal user identities if ISPs seek to avoid 
inclusion within the future scope of the scheme. This will create the potential for 
subscribers and other users to believe that the confidentiality of their identities is being, 
or is likely to be, breached or to become confused about what ISPs offer as conditions 
for the protection of their identities. 
 
                                                
67 (Dutton, et al., 2009), p. 9. The estimated number of users is derived from the total number of adult 
users (32 million) estimated earlier. 
68 Estimated as number of Internet users, as in the above footnote, multiplied by the share of users who 
report Internet café access (Dutton, et al., 2009), p.9. 
69 (Ofcom, 2010), para. 3.15. 
70 (Ofcom, 2010), para 3.24. 
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1.5 Summary	  
The impact of the online infringement of copyright provisions of the Act, in our 
assessment, will be affected by a wide range of interacting factors.  Studies of these 
factors yield contradictory results as to the likelihood that Internet users will use existing 
methods to acquire copyright protected online content. No clear logic is presented in the 
impact assessments of the Act concerning what a ‘socially appropriate level’ of 
investment by the creative industries in such content might be. In our view the question 
of balance or proportionality with respect to the Act must be considered in the light of 
innovative developments in ICTs including the Internet. We are witnessing the 
development of an online ‘participatory’ or ‘remix’ culture in which people are being 
encouraged to experiment with the applications offered on the Internet.  The online 
participatory culture is emerging rapidly in the UK consistent with fostering the 
development of the UK digital economy. The specific interventions that will be 
implemented under the Act have the potential to disrupt or alter the course of Internet 
development in ways that cannot be anticipated or assumed to be benign. 
 
The impact of the Act on ISPs includes reputational costs and damage to customer 
goodwill. These are likely to be damaged by the risk of ‘false positives’ where customers 
receive notifications of infringement or are charged with infringements erroneously and 
these costs were not estimated in the impact assessments.  It is likely that ISP reputations 
will be impacted by a loss of customer goodwill as a result of the effects on non-
infringing users by actions to pursue infringement.  These other users include other 
household members, those sharing their Internet connections, and users in various 
public places. The inclusiveness of the Act of all rights holders means that the costs of 
compliance are based on misleading assumptions. The costs of compliance are subject to 
assumptions about the (unknown) level of CIRs that will be generated by the 
implementation of the Act.  In addition, customers may switch to ISPs not included in 
the initial implementation of the Act.  The implementation proposals also raise questions 
about competition in the ISP market.   
 
The impact of the Act’s provisions on copyright infringement will lead to confusion on 
the part of ISP subscribers. This confusion will include doubts about what specific online 
activities will be deemed to be legal and illegal and which specific misbehaviours will 
attract a punishment.  This is likely to have the effect of reducing Internet use and the 
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benefits citizens and consumers receive from such use.  This runs counter to the 
Government’s aim of encouraging innovative and inclusive participation in the digital 
economy in the UK. Citizens and consumers will perceive that their behaviour is being 
monitored, raising issues of the protection of personal data and privacy as well as trust. 
Internet users’ abilities to understand changing social and legal norms about legal and 
illegal uses of the Internet cannot be taken for granted.  Research shows that copyright 
education campaigns have unpredictable effects, and in some cases, no effect. Any such 
campaigns aimed at educating people about legal behaviour need to be framed in the 
broad context of increasing digital literacy in an online participatory culture. If education 
about copyright is not framed in this way, it will run counter to the cultural and social 
shifts that are characterizing the phenomenon of social networking on the Internet and 
have little effect.  ISP subscribers will seek alternative means of avoiding detection, 
increasing encrypted traffic and the use of IP blocking software, and potentially raising 
security issues. 
 
The Act also will have effects on parties other than the subscriber.  Within the home, 
there may be as many as 15 million people at risk of having their Internet use affected by 
the pursuit of copyright infringing Internet users.  In the workplace, businesses will face 
costs of monitoring carefully the Internet use of some 29 million employees to avoid 
liabilities.  Today, it may be estimated that some 10 million people access the Internet at 
other people’s homes, raising concerns about the assignment of responsibility and the 
culture of sharing in Internet use.  It is likely that more than 7 million people use the 
Internet from school or university and that 6 million access the Internet at libraries.  All 
of these access sites face risks from those they allow to connect to the Internet and are 
likely to restrict, control or deny, access in the face of the risk of misuse.  These sites also 
will face increased costs of establishing and maintaining monitoring systems for Internet 
use.  Collectively, the scale of those likely to be affected by the Act who are not 
infringers is very large.  In addition, the conditions and culture of Internet use are likely 
to be affected in profound ways that we think are unlikely to be benign. 
 
2 Losses	  Suffered	  by	  Rights	  Holders	  and	  the	  Impact	  of	  the	  Act	  
The losses suffered by rights holders as a result of online infringement of copyright and 
the impact of the Act on those losses are examined in this section. 
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The Digital Economy Act 2010 includes provisions with respect to online infringement 
of copyright as a response, in part, to infringements in the fields of music, film, games 
and recreational software. ISPs that meet specified criteria are required to: 
• Notify their subscribers if the internet protocol (“IP”) addresses associated with them are 
reported by copyright owners as being used to infringe copyright; and 
• Keep track of the number of reports about each subscriber and, on request by a copyright owner, 
compile on an anonymous basis a list of those subscribers who are reported on by the copyright 
owner above a threshold set in the initial obligations code (“relevant subscribers”). After 
obtaining a court order to obtain personal details, copyright owners will be able to take action 
against those included in the list”.71 
 
We examine the potential loses suffered by the creative industries and the likely impact of 
the Act on those loses in this section.   
 
2.1 Losses	  Suffered	  by	  Rights	  Holders	  
A large number of studies attempt to ascertain what losses have been incurred by rights 
holders as a result of online infringement of copyright. Most of them conclude that it is 
very difficult to provide a definitive estimate.  
 
2.1.1 Market	  Analysis	  
A 2010 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report indicates that sectors 
affected by infringing use of digital content include the music, motion picture, television, 
publishing and software industries and that the methods of infringement include not only 
P2P networks, but also streaming sites and one-click hosting services.72  The report 
suggests that there are direct benefits of such behaviour, though it provides little 
information to document them.  These direct benefits include customers’ perceived 
benefits of freely acquiring such goods and the increased sales of legitimate goods as a 
result of consumer ‘sampling’ of infringing goods. In addition, copyright infringement 
increases the demand for bandwidth, generating benefits to other sectors, e.g. router 
suppliers, ISPs and mass storage producers, including the makers of MP3 devices. 
 
The GAO report concludes that “it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the net 
effect of counterfeiting and piracy on the economy as a whole”.  Both this report and an 
internationally focused 2008 OECD report conclude that “neither governments nor 
                                                
71 (UK Government, 2010b), para. 31. 
72 (Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2010) and (OECD, 2008). 
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industry were able to provide solid assessments of their respective situations”.73  The 
OECD study did not try to quantify the economic effects on industry revenues as a 
consequence of online digital copyright infringement due to the many methodological 
challenges such a study would entail. 74 Important factors in industry estimates include 
assumptions about the rate of substitution between legal and illegal products and about 
the extent of deception on the part of the content creator or confusion on the part of the 
Internet user as to whether a product is legal or illegal. These findings are taken into 
account in our assessment of the relevant literature. 
 
A 2010 review of the literature on the economics of copyright and digitalisation for the 
Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy (SABIP) emphasises that it is an 
empirical question as to whether any given copyright system is likely to offer a net 
welfare gain or a reduction in losses to the industry.75 This report highlights gaps in the 
research literature including: the effect of digital copying on user welfare; the effects of 
digital copying on major firms and fringe and new entrant suppliers; differences among 
markets; and the impact of copyright systems on follow-up creativity and socially 
desirable aspects of technological change. It highlights the contradictory empirical results 
on the impact of file-sharing on music industry revenues; results ranging from a strong, 
to virtually no impact.76  
 “The effect of file-sharing on authorised sales remains contentious.  Results and their 
interpretations vary considerably and none of the existing studies seems sufficiently conclusive as 
to settle the issue single-handedly”.77   
 
 
A key to deciding on copyright enforcement strategies is the incentives of both 
producers and consumers to break the law.78  A 2009 report to WIPO observes that the 
present state of understanding of the impacts of copyright violations does not provide 
insight into the complexity of behaviour in ‘real world’ markets. 
“Most academic studies are of a theoretical nature, that is, they develop models of supply and 
demand to ascertain how unauthorized uses of intellectual property impact on different agents in 
the economy. … By nature these models cannot capture the sophisticated complexities of how 
markets for IPR-protected goods function in the real world”. 79 
 
                                                
73 (Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2010), p. 16. 
74 (Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2010), p. 24 and (OECD, 2008), Executive Summary p. 16. 
75 (Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy, 2010). 
76 (Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy, 2010), p. 61. 
77 (Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy, 2010), p. 64-5. 
78 (World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 2009), p. 4. 
79 (World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 2009), p. 5. 
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The WIPO report emphasises that the welfare effects in any particular case are an 
empirical question.  
 
Liebowitz argues that explanations other than file-sharing have little or no support in 
explaining the decline in music industry revenues. He speculates that file-sharing has 
received greater visibility because of parallel discussions of the ‘creative commons’ and 
debates about whether open or closed networks foster innovation most effectively. 
Liebowitz says, with respect to the US studies, that the data come from only a few 
sources, that panel data may be unreliable, and that fear of reporting on actual behaviour 
if it may be subject to legal action, are factors to consider in assessing claims about losses. 
Reviewing evidence on substitution effects, sampling and network effects, and indirect 
appropriability (quality of copies), he concludes that, while file-sharing is the principal 
cause for revenue decreases, “we do not yet have enough evidence to draw any but a 
preliminary conclusion”.80 
 
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf’s81 study is often cited as indicating that downloading has a 
statistically insignificant impact on music sales.  Like other studies it makes a number of 
assumptions in an attempt to isolate the effects of file-sharing on sales. Hietanen et al. 
draw attention to the variability of the evidence base, pointing to the importance of 
diverse entertainment content in estimating the effects.  They find that users, generally, 
are aware that they are breaking the law, many believing that file-sharing is morally 
commendable.82 
 
Studies of losses also make assumptions about the impact of legal threats on user 
behaviour. Users who share large amounts of music have been found to react differently 
to legal threats than those who share a smaller number of files. Based on a before-after 
research design of users in the context of Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) legal actions in the US, Bhattacharjee et al. found that there was evidence of a 
decline in sharing and acknowledged that their results do not reflect the possibility that 
users switched to other means of downloading.83  Their study of the impact of file-
sharing on the survival rate of music albums on a leading ‘top 100’ chart suggests that 
                                                
80 (Liebowitz, 2006a), p. 25; see also (Liebowitz, 2006b). 
81 (Oberholzer-Gee & Strumpf, 2007). 
82 (Hietanen, et al., 2008). 
83 (Bhattacharjee, et al., 2006), see also PhD Thesis by (Lertwachara, 2004). 
 24 
sharing reduces the survival of albums that debut on the charts at lower levels, but not 
on the highly ranked albums.  They also found that superstar and female artists are more 
likely to survive on the charts and that this continues to be so with the advent of greater 
file-sharing.84 
 
The evidence from the business and economics literature reviewed above is inconclusive 
regarding the behavioural relationship between file-sharing and physical or online 
acquisition of non-infringing content, a conclusion shared by the authors of two recent 
reviews of the literature.85 Most studies are concerned with losses stemming from 
copyright infringement related to music recorded on compact discs and there is relatively 
little evidence concerning effects in other content markets. In addition, as the issue of 
copyright infringement has become increasingly prominent in the media, self-reported 
consumer behaviour is more difficult to interpret. Survey respondents may become 
strategic with respect to their behaviour and intentions: “students, who are often the 
subjects in surveys of illegal file-sharing, may either not admit that they are engaging in 
illegal activity, or may admit to such behavior because it may be popular for this 
demographic”.86 
 
There is little question that some sales of copyrighted material would have been made in 
the absence of infringing content on the Internet. However, the assumptions made in 
most studies, and in the impact assessments for the Act, about behavioural change are 
central to any assessment of industry reported losses generally, and to an assessment of 
the losses or gains to the creative industries in the wake of the implementation of the Act. 
 
2.1.2 Intentions	  and	  Behavioural	  Analysis	  
In addition to studies employing analytical methods from business and economics, many 
experimental studies have been conducted within the theoretical framework of a social 
psychological understanding of the relationships between reported intentions and actual 
behaviour and within the framework of sociological theories of deviant behaviour and 
the propensity for ‘neutralisation’ behaviour. 
 
                                                
84 (Bhattacharjee, et al., 2007). 
85(Oberholzer-Gee & Strumpf, 2010); (Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy, 2010). 
86 (Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2010), p. 21. 
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Harris, for example, examined the self-reported justifications of file sharers – suggesting 
that P2P file-sharers employ (multiple) techniques of neutralization to pre-justify or post-
event rationalize their activities (denial of victim; denial of injury; denial of responsibility; 
claim of normality; claim of relative acceptability; justification by comparison; and appeal 
to higher loyalties).87 Ingram and Hinduja used a similar framework to consider deviant 
behaviour, suggesting that universities may facilitate infringement because of the high 
value placed on group norms (in the US). 88 
 
Holsapple et al. discuss factors likely to influence infringing behaviour in the case of 
software, including perceived value, inertia, visibility, access, legal sanctions, technical 
solutions, informal sanctions of self-control and ethics, and perceived benefits of 
noncompliance, including fairness, and a host of other contextual factors. They find that 
infringing behaviour cannot be assumed to be similar to crimes like arson and, therefore, 
that theories of behaviour change drawn from criminology are difficult to apply in the 
case of illegal sharing of software, leading them to argue for a forward-looking research 
agenda.89 
 
Li and Nergadze examined the deterrence effect of legal and non-legal approaches to 
infringing behaviour in the US based on a survey. They found that reported behaviour is 
most affected by the certainty of punishment and that awareness of the law plays a weak 
role in deterring the likelihood of future file-sharing. More important factors were the 
perceived stigma of being labelled a pirate and agreement or disagreement with the law. 
In this study the majority of students was not deterred by the threat of RIAA legal suits.90 
 
LaRose and Kim provide a social cognitive perspective on music downloading based on 
a study of college students in the US, finding that expected outcomes of downloading 
behaviour and deficient self-regulation of that behaviour are determinants but that habit 
is a stronger influence than perceptions of norms. Perceived norms did not influence 
intentions to download and this, in turn, had no relation to CD purchases or 
subscriptions to online paid music services.  Variables considered were moral 
                                                
87 (Harris & Dumas, 2009). 
88 (Ingram & Hinduja, 2008). 
89 (Holsapple, et al., 2008). 
90 (Li & Nergadze, 2009). 
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justification, descriptive norms (pride in being a ‘pirate’), self-efficacy, ‘out of control’ 
downloading, social outcomes, novelty, saving money, and perception of moral norms.91   
 
The ‘Theory of Planned Behaviour’ has been used to predict the illegal use of software. 
Liao et al. found that perceived risk influences the likelihood of intentions – but that 
perceived risk is a complex matter involving performance, social aspects, prosecution and 
psychological concerns. Here, perceived norms of behaviour had little impact on 
intentions, 92 but this finding is contradicted by another study based on a different 
sample and somewhat different research design.93  Still another study found that 
deterrence did not affect the intentions of non-downloaders, but did affect the intentions 
of both light and heavy downloaders. Attitudes, subjective norms and behavioural 
control had no effect on the intentions of non-downloaders in this study.94 
  
Overall, studies from several disciplines indicate that it is unclear what effects that 
various types of prosecution, threats of prosecution and other sanctions are likely to 
have.95  
 
2.1.3 Studies	  of	  Creative	  Industry	  Strategies	  
Another fact to be taken into account in assessing losses is the unpredictable behaviour 
of companies within the creative industries. Some music industry strategies may be 
having the opposite effect of what is intended (e.g. law suits, technical solutions, 
information campaigns, and lobbying for stricter laws).  When Apple launched its 
downloading service – iTunes Music Store 2003 - its sales quickly rose to 70 per cent of 
the level of infringing downloads on Apple Macs.  Case studies suggest that legal digital 
services appeal to certain more mature users but that illegal digital services continue to 
appeal to bootleggers, aficionados and singles-buying youths.96 In research conducted in 
2003, Bakker assumed that most sharing was of MP3s.  He also pointed out that 
companies are developing new functionalities and services in the package offered by their 
                                                
91 (LaRose & Kim, 2007). 
92 (Liao, et al., 2010). 
93 (Morton & Koufteros, 2008). 
94 (Plowman & Goode, 2009). 
95 (Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy, 2010), p.66; (Blackburn, 2004); (Maffioletti & 
Ramello, 2004); (Rob & Waldfogel, 2006). 
96 (Bakker, 2005) notes that Kazaa, Gnutella and Morpheus services filled a gap when Napster was closed 
down. Other services like MusicMatch, MusicNor, pressplay, Rhapsody MusicNet, Weblisten and 
Napster 2.0 have more complicated digital rights management systems the earliest services. 
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paid services, including reliability, reduced security problems, faster and porn-free access 
with extra features such as celebrity play lists, exclusive tracks, album art, gift certificates, 
allowances and streaming audio, leading to changes in the attractiveness of legal services.  
As a result the behavioural changes of users cannot be assumed based on the recent past.  
 
If segments of the music industry begin adopting new business models in response to 
changing consumer behaviour such as, for example, a ransom model (only part of a story 
available until payment), a tipping model, a promotion model, a customer data model 
(charge per use), preferred placement models on search engines, or the industry accepts a 
statutory levy, or music is bundled with other subscription-based content, shifting to a 
service concept,97 there could be many unexpected changes in customer behaviour that 
are not taken into account in studies of industry losses. Revenue sharing arrangements 
through collaborations within online communities,98 including voluntary payment models 
and complementary product and service-based models are also being suggested. Regner 
et al. observe that, for the creative industry, government intervention is the safest option 
as compared to investing rapidly in new methods of online revenue generation.99 
 
The long-term impacts on losses associated with changes in the creative industries’ 
business models, cultural diversity, and the accessibility of content need to be considered 
in the assessment of impacts and claims about losses. The proliferation of digital 
distribution networks, combined with the availability of digital technology, have loosened 
the industry’s control over access to these products, such that only part of the decline in 
music sales can be attributed to file-sharing. However, information is in short supply on 
everything from business models for the music industry to the growth of games that is 
accompanying broadband expansion. In addition file sharers are also important 
customers of the creative industry. Research results offer static snapshots of 
developments in file-sharing and do not take into account the dynamics of changes in 
both industry and user behaviour. van Eijk et al. conclude that: 
“It turns out that online media provide a number of new avenues for creators and producers to 
reach their intended audiences, without significant gatekeepers preventing them from doing so. It is 
up to government, as part of its cultural policy and its policy to strengthen the country's innovative 
power and competitive edge, to consider identifying the promotion of innovation in the 
                                                
97 (Dubosson-Torbay, et al., nd). 
98 (Quiring, et al., 2008). 
99 (Regner, et al., 2009). 
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entertainment industry as a key priority. Introducing new protective measures does not seem the 
right way to go”.100 
 
Another important factor in assessing assumptions about changes in behaviour that are 
embedded in studies of industry losses is the extent to which users ‘blame’ technology 
for any online misbehaviour.  Selwyn’s study of self-reported online misbehaviour in the 
UK concludes that users “blame” the Internet for encouraging misbehaviour or deviant 
behaviour. 101 
 
2.1.4 Regulation	  in	  a	  Changing	  Environment	  
The Government acknowledged that “technology used for the purposes of online 
infringement of copyright is changing fast and it is not possible at the time of enactment 
to know which technical measures would be effective”.102 In assessing the Act’s impacts, 
it is important to consider the indications of changes in citizen and consumer behaviour 
and perceptions of the value of file-sharing as well as the continuously changing business 
models employed by the creative industry to generate new revenue streams associated 
with the online distribution of digital content.  
 
In the light of our review in the preceding sections, considerations in assessing the 
impact of losses on the industry include effects related to legal and other actions taken 
against sites that provide or facilitate access to copyright infringing content.   
 
There is little question that some sales of copyrighted material occur because of copyright 
infringement, e.g. sharing of an infringing item leading to a desire to purchase an 
ordinary copy (one that is more permanent and includes other features as in the case of 
music CD ‘liner’ material). There is also little question that some sales are lost due to the 
availability of infringing content.  Different balances between these possibilities are 
found in the literature and there is some evidence that the magnitude of the losses or 
gains depends upon the specific group of customers attracted to a particular good.103 In 
addition, the volume of file-sharing appears to be influenced by the (changing) relative 
convenience of acquiring infringing and non-infringing content. In short, the Act is an 
intervention in a rapidly changing environment in which several effects are at work. 
                                                
100 (van Eijk, et al., 2010), p. 53. 
101 (Selwyn, 2008), p. 462. 
102 (UK Government, 2010b), para. 61. 
103 (Dutton, et al., 2009). 
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A first effect on online file-sharing infringement is the closure of certain sites that 
significantly reduces the availability of infringing material.  This may have contributed to 
a reduction in the extent of infringing downloading, in part, because users seeking 
infringing content must devise new ways of acquiring such content. There are also issues 
of the perceived quality of content. If there is a very low probability of consumers 
obtaining high quality copies of digital content by illicit downloading this may influence 
user behaviour towards high quality legal content.104 
 
A second effect is the entry and growth of merchants selling musical content online, a 
development that began by selling ‘copy protected’ content (content only playable 
through a ‘player’ that automatically verifies the ownership rights for a particular item).  
This market subsequently evolved to provide music that is not ‘copy protected’ in a bid 
to increase the attractiveness of downloading music to be used in other ‘players’ 
including MP3 devices.  Even in the first stage, iTunes, the largest online music vendor, 
made such transfers possible with copy-protected content.  Prices charged for online 
music vary and are sometimes lower than those for the physical product, although costs 
are also lower.  To our knowledge, there is no definitive research-based evidence 
concerning the net effect of legitimate online sales on the overall revenue or gross 
profitability of music copyright owners.  In addition, the relative convenience and added 
service available from legitimate vendors of copyright music may be reducing the 
demand for infringing content. 
 
A third effect on online infringement is the increasing availability of material where the 
copyright owner has, through various means including the ‘creative commons’ license, 
indicated that those who copy will not be required to pay for copying.  We are not legal 
experts, so we do not offer an opinion on whether copying of such material constitutes 
‘infringement’ in a legal sense.  However, the availability of such content diverts some 
user demand from copyrighted content, regardless of whether it is acquired by online 
infringement or other, legitimate, means. 
 
In addition, a number of other effects that may have an impact on downloading of 
infringing content include education campaigns, the placing of ‘rubbish files’ (those not 
                                                
104 (Fetscherin, 2005); see also (Fetscherin, 2006). 
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containing the infringing content expected or containing incomplete, distorted or 
otherwise imperfect copies of infringing content) in P2P distribution networks to disrupt 
user aims of acquiring infringing content, and the deceleration of growth in online users 
in the UK, which reduces the number of new users who might engage in acquiring 
infringing content.   
 
None of these other effects is systematically examined in the academic or business 
literature to our knowledge. 
 
2.2 Impact	  of	  the	  Act	  on	  Rights	  Holders’	  Losses	  
The balance of the above effects is unclear given rapid changes in the online 
participatory culture in the UK and elsewhere.  The evidence based on empirical studies 
is contradictory, but there are indications of a growing gap between what citizens and 
consumers perceive as ‘good’ online behaviour, i.e. sharing of many forms of digital 
content, and the rights holders’ view of such behaviour.  This makes it very difficult to 
estimate the impact of the Act on rights holder losses.  A central issue is what the 
‘behavioural response’ (how people choose to act differently) to the Act will be and how 
people will respond to the measures it sets in place. As above, the research literature 
indicates that this assessment is extremely difficult to make because of the rapid and 
continuing changes in the online participatory culture in the UK. 
 
Estimates of revenue restoration to film and television rights holders made by IPSOS,105 
a key study cited in the Government’s impact assessments for the Act, are based upon 
the assumption that individuals who acquire copyright infringing material will reliably 
predict their own behaviour if this alternative is unavailable.  This is defective for several 
reasons: 
 
• It is a well-known principle that a zero or very low price leads to greater 
consumption and that increasing the price will reduce the quantity demanded. 
• It cannot be assumed that the answers of individuals confronted with the 
question of how they would otherwise acquire or view a film or television 
programme for which they had previously not paid, can be used to predict 
purchase behaviour. 
                                                
105 (IPSOS, 2007). 
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• In the survey upon which the estimates were based customers were not 
confronted with the costs of their alternative choices (these were assigned 
afterwards in the analysis). 
• In the survey upon which the estimates were based customers were not given the 
option of selecting ‘would not have seen’, but this answer is assigned if they 
respond, ‘none of these’ (to a list of alternative non-infringing methods of 
viewing or acquisition). 
 
It is assumed that measures taken under the Act will be very effective in foreclosing the 
exchange of infringing material.  This assumption does not appear to be warranted based 
upon historical and contemporaneous experience. 
 
Alternative technological means exist for the exchange of infringing material that cannot 
be readily detected, e.g. cryptography. The Act and its provisions for enforcement create 
incentives for further innovations.  A core group of individuals engaged in extensive file 
exchange is likely to continue using such innovations or creating them.  An analogous 
case is that of child pornography where an outright ban with criminal penalties for 
violating it has, unfortunately, not eradicated the exchange of these materials. The efforts 
to avoid detection (discussed further in Section 1.3.3) will reduce the effectiveness of the 
Act, particularly for those most heavily engaged in infringement. 
 
As indicated by studies adopting theories of the relationship between intentions and 
behaviour, the evidence is contradictory.  The willingness of typical users to follow users 
who are more determined to engage in the exchange of copyrighted material depends 
upon the interaction of many factors. In addition to issues of changing perceptions of 
norms, moral behaviour and learning, these include: innovations in the means of sharing 
that make it more difficult or less reliable to detect copyright infringement; media reports 
of experience with the Act’s implementation providing insights into the likelihood of 
detection; the availability of alternative means of accessing networks where identity is not 
recorded or is obscured; and the record of copyright holders in pursuing those who are 
identified to them following a petition to a court. Media reports of social movement 
organisations that become involved in discussions about different forms of infringement 
are likely to shape the attitudes and behaviours of users.  For instance, the case of 
Sklyarov, arrested for cracking the encryption of Adobe’s e-Book in 2001, was an 
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instance where the mobilisation of a social movement against digital rights management 
gave a high profile to issues of fair use, free speech and innovation.106  These issues are 
not adequately considered in the Act’s impact assessment statements or in developing 
estimates concerning future user behaviour. 
 
2.3 Summary	  
Research on the losses suffered by creative industry rights holders focuses on market 
analysis, Internet user intentions and behaviours, and the business strategies of the 
creative industry companies.  While there is little question that some sales of copyrighted 
material would have been made in the absence of infringing content and file-sharing the 
results of market analyses do not provide robust conclusions, in part, because of the 
assumptions made about behavioural change.  The results of studies of intentions, 
behavioural change, deviant behaviour, the effects of deterrents, and cognitive 
perceptions of moral behaviour online, are ambiguous at best. These studies call into 
question assumptions about the impact of interventions as required by the Act and 
consequent reductions in infringing behaviour using P2P file-sharing. The creative 
industries are continuously developing new business models, with effects on infringing 
behaviour that cannot be predicted.  The changing volume of file-sharing is also 
influenced by the changing relative convenience of file-sharing. This may be affected by 
the closure of certain sites, changes in the availability of high quality copies, the growth 
of legitimate outlets for sales of copy-protected content, the growth in the availability of 
content under ‘creative commons’ licenses, the introduction of education campaigns, and 
techniques to disrupt user acquisition of infringing files.  
 
Given the difficulties in estimating the extent of industry losses attributable to file-
sharing and the evidence that the efficacy of interventions in changing user behaviour by 
threatening what citizens and consumers otherwise regard as ‘good’ online behaviour is 
questionable, the impact of the Act on rights holders’ losses is difficult to predict.  
Studies that purport to show the direct effect of measures, such as those incorporated in 
the Act, are forced to rely upon hypothetical assessments of future behavioural change. 
Existing studies, such as the IPSOS study, have employed questionable methods to make 
such assessments.  For example, it is not appropriate to assume that barring access to 
infringing files will lead to acquisition of the estimated amount and type of content at 
                                                
106 (Postigo, 2010). 
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prevailing prices.  Even if the assumption is granted that illicit file-sharing has reduced 
the price of content, an intervention that seeks to suppress illicit file-sharing will only 
‘restore revenue’ to the extent that it is effective.  Even if attempts to suppress file-
sharing enhance demand for non-infringing content, they also create a demand for new 
technologies to facilitate infringement and, in some social groups, may even enhance the 
attractiveness of illicit behaviour.  
 
3 The	  Impact	  Assessments	  for	  the	  Act	  
In this section we examine the impact assessments for the Act with regard to the benefits 
to rights holders and the impact on ISPs and users so as to comment on the balancing 
exercise they reveal.  We consider this in three parts: 3.1, the assessment of benefits to 
rights holders; 3.2, the impacts on ISPs; and 3.3, the impacts on users as set out in the 
impact assessments.  Section 3.4 summarises our comment on the balancing act that it 
reveals. The Government’s assessment of the benefits to rights holders is based, in part, 
on the results of eight studies reported in Table 1 “Selection of Studies Estimating the 
Sales Displacement Effect” in the Impact Assessment Study.107  We have reviewed seven 
of the studies available to us. In our assessment, these studies are interpreted in a light 
that favours the Government’s position without acknowledging alternative explanations 
for the results or the questionable assumptions upon which they are based in some 
instances.  
 
3.1 Assessment	  of	  Benefits	  to	  Rights	  Holders	  
The Government concludes that the benefits to the rights holders from the Act will be 
an average annual benefit of £200 million. 
 
This figure is based upon an argument presented in two steps.   
 
The first step is to estimate the revenues foregone by rights holders as the result of 
infringement stemming from downloading – this is estimated to be in the vicinity of 
£400 million.  The second step is to argue that roughly half of this foregone revenue will 
                                                
107 Table 1, (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, et al., 2010b), p. 107 and see (Oberholzer-
Gee & Strumpf, 2007); (IPSOS, 2007); (Zentner, 2006); (Rob & Waldfogel, 2006); (Hennig-Thurau, et 
al., 2007); and (Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2004).  
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be recovered by curtailing one-half of infringing downloads.  Each of these steps is 
considered in turn. 
 
The estimate for rights holder losses is based upon several industry studies with some 
reference to academic studies of the revenue ‘displacement’ effects stemming from 
downloading. 
 
The specific method for reaching the £400 million estimate is to assign values for the 
losses to three classes of rights holders: a) film and television, b) music, and c) games and 
entertainment software. For example, the method used to estimate the loss to film and 
television rights holders (£152 million) is based upon asking a statistical sample of 
individuals who admit to acquiring infringing content what they would do if they did not 
acquire the material by file-sharing.108  While standards for predicting behaviour differ 
among academic disciplines, asking a question about an issue about which respondents 
might be embarrassed or feel challenged and providing a ‘safe’ and predictable alternative, 
as was done in the IPSOS study, is not likely to be a reliable predictor of actual behaviour. 
In the case of the IPSOS study, these answers are then used to infer the revenues that 
would flow to the various non-infringing sources of such material (theatre attendance, 
DVD purchase or rental and so on). 
 
This method of assessing behavioural change is highly speculative.  It is not based upon 
actual behaviour nor does the question asked to these individuals identify the costs of 
their choices.  The music component of the total (£160 million) is based upon a study by 
Jupiter Research (2007) which we have not had the opportunity to examine.109  The 
videogames and software component of the total is based upon an ad hoc assumption 
that the industry revenue share of the loss, measured by the above speculative method 
for film and television which amounts to 2 per cent of industry revenue, is applicable to 
this segment, implying a loss of £80 million. 
 
Our view of the balance of the evidence is that the industry has experienced a loss from 
file-sharing activity. The methodology employed in the impact assessments for 
                                                
108 (IPSOS, 2007).  See Section 2.2 for further commentary on this study. 
109 We found only a summary of this report online.  The report was requested but was not provided to us.  
As a result the methodology underlying the figure £160 million could not be reviewed. 
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concluding that it amounts £400 million per year is, to the extent that we have been able 
to examine it, seriously flawed. 
 
The second step in the logic of the impact assessment reports is to estimate the reduction in 
infringing file-sharing that might follow from the series of actions taken by rights holders 
(the CIRs) and ISPs (notification letters).  Based upon experience with the memorandum 
of understanding in which a trial of notification methods was conducted, it is estimated 
that the reduction of file-sharing activity would be 50 per cent. 
 
Regardless of whether this would, in fact, be the case in any longer term experience when 
alternative means of acquiring infringing content will be devised, the assumption is that 
this 50 per cent reduction in downloading of infringing files will lead to a corresponding 
increase in sales – i.e. that if an item cannot be freely downloaded, it will be purchased.  
No other basis is given for the estimate that one-half of the value of estimated losses 
from copyright infringement is taken as the appropriate projected increase in revenues 
for rights holders.  This is inappropriate as a matter of both common sense and 
economic logic. In terms of common sense, it is unrealistic to assume that everyone will 
pay for something he or she has previously acquired for free. In terms of economics, it 
assumes that demand is perfectly inelastic, that is, a change in price does not have an 
effect on the quantity demanded. To propose that this ‘revenue recovery’ would continue 
over a decade, yielding a present value benefit of £1.7 billion for rights holders is 
inappropriate not only because it perpetuates the original flaw in the estimate of annual 
revenue gain, but also because people’s valuations of the benefits of digital content are 
subject to change, especially when innovation is giving rise to many new sources and 
distribution outlets for such content.  
 
The ways that people legally acquire music already are undergoing major change towards 
digital forms of distribution where prices are lower.  Over the next decade, further 
increases in digital distribution of other content will occur.  This content also is likely to 
command as high a price as that received in other channels of music distribution.  This 
estimate takes no account of other influences on demand such as the growth of user-
produced content or other competing alternatives for customer time and money, some 
of which are identified in Section 2.1.4 above. 
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3.2 The	  Impacts	  on	  ISPs	  	  
The estimates of the costs to ISPs of the implementation of the relevant part of the Act 
are confined to two effects: 1) the direct costs of implementing the notification system 
and 2) the loss of customers stemming solely from the assumptions about the increased 
price of ISP services stemming from the Act. 
 
A key assumption driving the estimated costs of the notification system is the number of 
notification letters that will be generated.  The industry estimate of 6.5 million infringing 
users is used as the basis for this estimate, along with the assumptions about the need to 
send a second letter or take further action.  The actual number of CIRs that will be 
generated is, however, unknown.  NERA has estimated the number of such CIRs using a 
series of assumptions that is also based upon a large estimate of infringing users and 
additional assumptions concerning the effectiveness of detection.110  Ultimately NERA 
takes industry estimates from the film, television, and ‘record’ industries concerning the 
number of CIRs they expect will be sent and then make additional assumptions about 
the number of CIRs generated by other rights holders based upon surmise.111  The result 
is that NERA expects that there will be 365,617 CIRs per week, noting that “each 
infringing IP address will not correspond to a unique account holder and each 
notification may refer to more than one CIR”.112  It is assumed that this volume of CIRs 
will be matched effectively to subscribers to generate notification letters   It is outside 
our expertise and the information available to us to assess whether the costs attributed to 
the operation of this system have been appropriately estimated.  We are sceptical, 
however, of the proposition that the translation of CIRs to user notification letters will 
be as straightforward as is assumed based on experience in examining the 
implementation of other large-scale data processing systems.  
 
The other component of cost estimated for ISPs is the loss of customers from the 
assumed increase in ISP subscriber service prices as compliance costs are passed on to 
customers.  This amounts to the revenue that would have been earned from the loss of 
between 10,000 and 40,000 customers due to an increase in the price of ISP service of 
between 0.2 and 0.6 per cent.  The estimate of the number of customers lost is based 
upon a traditional demand elasticity study (which translates changes in price into changes 
                                                
110 (NERA Economic Consulting, 2010). 
111 (NERA Economic Consulting, 2010), p. 7. 
112 (NERA Economic Consulting, 2010), p. 7. 
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in quantity demanded based upon prior experience with price variation).  It does not 
include any allowance for the possible cancellations of subscriptions due to a loss of ISP 
reputation or customer trust or to cancellations by subscribers who derived value from 
their ISP connection from infringing activity.   
 
No acknowledgement is made of the likelihood that when ISPs become agents of 
copyright enforcement the resulting compromise in trust in the privacy of personal 
communications or the misidentification of customers as infringing will lead to a further 
loss of customers.  The size of this effect may be substantial.  It may also result in a 
specific loss to individual ISPs as customers migrate to other ways of accessing the 
Internet or subscribe to other networks. 
 
3.3 The	  Impacts	  on	  Users	  
The impact assessments prepared for the Act barely acknowledge that Internet users may 
be affected by the Act.  The apparent reason for this is the argument that the Act will 
affect only those users who are infringers and that their welfare, because of their 
infringement, should not be considered.  Those unable to pay for digital content also will 
suffer a welfare loss from the unavailability of the infringing content.  Similarly, however, 
these users only benefit because their behaviour infringes copyright and so their losses 
are also excluded.  Whether there is a legal basis for this exclusion is outside our expertise.  
It is, however, not an appropriate economic analysis of costs and benefits, one of the 
purposes of an impact assessment. 
 
The impact assessments prepared for the Act do not acknowledge and, therefore, fail to 
estimate any other costs that might be borne by users.  In Sections 1.3 and 1.4, we 
identify a number of effects, including the costs associated with false positives in the 
identification of infringing users; the costs of establishing and maintaining user 
monitoring systems in businesses and public institutions such as schools, libraries and 
universities; the liabilities incurred by users sharing their connections with others in their 
homes; and the risks of exclusion or reduction in the quality of Internet use for those not 
involved in infringing behaviour.  We are not in a position at this time to make an 
estimate of the size of these costs.  However, the number of people affected and the 
implications this has for the current culture of Internet access and use suggest that these 
costs will be substantial. 
 38 
 
3.4 The	  Balancing	  Revealed	  
The methods chosen for assessing the costs and benefits of the Act and their 
implementation reveal a strong bias favouring rights holders over any other segment of 
society. 
 
Infringing users are eliminated from consideration because their actions are taken to be a 
violation of law, even if otherwise they would not be able or willing to contribute to rights 
holder revenues.  Thus, no estimate is made of the welfare effect on these users other than 
the note that if they were considered, “US evidence indicates that were this cost [the 
welfare loss of those unable or unwilling to pay] to be monetised it could outweigh the 
monetised benefits”.113  The corollary or collateral effects of this welfare loss are not 
considered, such as those noted above in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. 
 
ISP costs are confined to two narrow categories: the costs of compliance with the Act 
and the loss of customers and revenue stemming from passing these costs onto 
customers.114  The possibilities that ISPs will lose reputation or customers as the result of 
the implementation are not acknowledged or estimated.  We note that although the costs 
to schools, universities and libraries are not considered in the impact assessments, the 
issues and costs are beginning to be acknowledged (though not quantified) in subsequent 
implementation guides related to the Act.115 
 
3.5 Summary	  
The impact assessments for the Act appear to be based on: 1) estimates of revenue loss 
that are methodologically unsound; 2) estimates of behaviour change that are 
inappropriate as a matter of common sense (consumers will not necessarily buy what 
they previously have obtained freely) and economic analysis (demand is never perfectly 
inelastic); and 3) failure to acknowledge, let alone estimate, costs that could readily have 
been anticipated.  In our view, the impact assessments fail to weigh or balance adequately 
                                                
113 (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, et al., 2010a), p. 55. 
114 Additional costs include customer service costs associated with greater use of helplines with 
subscribers calling for advice than was assumed by the Government, additional migration costs when 
subscribers switch to other ISPs, the costs of competitive distortions, set up and administration costs, 
the costs of operating the appeals system for subscribers claiming they have been accused falsely. 
Witness Statement of Andrew Heaney, TalkTalk Telecom Group Limited, June 2010. 
115 (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, et al., 2010c). 
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the interests of all those in society who will be affected by the Act.  In addition, by 
increasing the liability for and risk of all forms of Internet connection sharing, the Act’s 
provisions alter the course of development of the Internet in ways that cannot be 
captured fully by a cost benefit analysis. 
 
Our conclusions – that social welfare may be greater with file-sharing than without, that 
the industry losses due to file-sharing cannot be accurately assessed, and that, on balance, 
it is not possible to conclude that actions aimed at behavioural change will produce a net 
social welfare gain - are very similar to those reached by a report commissioned for 
SABIP, the UK Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy.116  
 
“Despite considerable progress, the existing empirical literature does not yet provide a solid 
grounding for determining whether, and to what extent, it is worth fighting private, unauthorised 
copying in its newest guise of digital copying. Judging by the considerable interest the issue has 
received during the last few years, further studies on the effect of digital copying on demand for 
authorised copies are likely to be produced. It remains to be seen whether better data and 
research coverage of more recent years will at least resolve the issue of whether digital copying 
has a detrimental effect on rights holders. The inclination may be to go with the majority of 
studies and to accept that file-sharing has harmed the record industry. The few studies that incorporate 
the benefits to consumers tend to find that social welfare has improved nevertheless”. (emphasis added)117  
 
In assessing the issue of the proportionality of the Act there are a number of important 
issues that were not considered in the impact assessments and that we were not able to 
assess fully in this report.  A more complete assessment would take into account the 
specific structure of the ISP industry in the UK, providing an analysis of the 
competitiveness of the top tier and other ISP providers when only some of these 
providers are required to implement the measures required by the Ofcom Draft Code.  It 
would provide a full quantitative welfare analysis with consideration given to the welfare 
gains and losses to all stakeholders including consumers.  It would take account of the 
implications for privacy protection in the light of the rights of citizens and the impact on 
ISP reputations and as a result of the notification measures and the potential release of 
subscriber identities to representatives of the creative industries.  Greater consideration 
would also be given to the possible technical restrictions that ISPs and others, not 
initially included within the scope of the scheme, may place on the use of their networks 
in terms of the costs incurred by providers and the reduction in the value of network 
                                                
116 According to its website (http://www.sabip.org.uk/home/about.htm) “The Strategic Advisory Board 
for Intellectual Property Policy (SABIP) is an independent, Non-Departmental Public Body with the 
Intellectual Property Office as its sponsoring agency”. 
117 (Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy, 2010), p. 71. 
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access to users (including those who access WiFi networks as mobile offices). In 
summary, the full disruptive effects and social costs of the intervention called for by the 
Act have not been examined sufficiently in the impact assessments. 
 
4 Alternative	  Approaches	  to	  Reducing	  Impacts	  of	  Online	  Infringement	  of	  
Copyright	  	  
In this section we consider whether there are any other ways in which the objective of 
reducing the impact of online infringement of copyright could be achieved, looking first 
at whether there are innovative solutions (4.1) and, second, at the experiences of other 
countries (4.2).  The measures set out in the Act and Ofcom’s Draft Initial Obligations 
Code are predicated on the assumption that a system of mass notifications will “educate 
consumers about copyright and bring about a change in consumer behaviour”.118  In 
other words, there is a strong assumption that consumer and citizen behavioural change 
will occur, such that infringing behaviour declines.  The robustness of these assumptions 
has been called into question by our review. The Government asserts that “copyright 
offences are usually committed for economic gain and the Government wants to ensure 
that the courts have effective remedies to deny offenders the profits of their crimes”.119  
In the case of file-sharing and related activities, there are indications that motivations to 
engage in illegal downloading may be associated only weakly with the incentive of 
economic gain.  It is also claimed that the level of file-sharing has reduced the incentive 
for the creative industries to invest in the development, production and distribution of 
innovative content. 120 We are not in a position to evaluate this claim as, for the purposes 
of this assessment, we did not have access to evidence on the actual rate of investment 
by segments of the digital content industry in new innovative content or on the 
incentives facing shareholders and investors. However, the preceding sections of this 
report suggest that there is good reason to question whether the current approach as 
mandated by the Act is proportional, given the overall weakness of the evidence on the 
costs and the contradictory evidence about Internet user responses. 
 
                                                
118 (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2010), p. 36. 
119 (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, et al., 2010b), p. 32. 
120 (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, et al., 2010b), pp. 18, 19. 
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4.1 Alternative	  Measures	  	  
The provisions of the Act with respect to online infringement come at time when it 
appears that the creative industries’ associations and firms are beginning to reassess the 
benefits in revenue recovery that are likely to result from threatened and actual legal 
actions aimed at the majority of Internet users.  Ofcom’s initial target is to encompass 
seven ISPs, each with more than 400,000 subscribers accounting for 96.5 per cent of the 
residential and small and medium-sized business broadband market in the UK.121  
 
In the US, after thousands of legal suits against individuals, the RIAA is said to have 
begun seeking greater cooperation with ISPs in a bid to target only the major alleged 
offenders.122 In the US, the US Copyright Group, a group of lawyers, has sent large 
numbers of letters to alleged infringing individuals demanding payments of USD$1,500 
to $2,500 to avoid further legal action.  This involved obtaining the agreement of 
independent film makers and observers note that the expectation is that individuals will 
prefer to settle rather than face court action.123  One of the risks of broad inclusion of 
rights holders is the creation of incentives for this sort of legal entrepreneurship. It seems 
likely that the dynamic process of innovation across the industry is resulting in a cycle 
where those firms whose profit margins are threatened by illegal activity seek first to 
change individual behaviour and then to reconsider the balance in terms of the costs and 
reputational set-backs to brands as a result, then moving on to devise more innovative 
solutions.   
 
Alternative solutions that may curtail infringing practices, include: 
 
• The strategy of pursuing, at a global level, those responsible for either hosting or 
facilitating access to large amounts of infringing content which appears to have 
an effect through the case-by-case suppression of such sites. 
 
•  ‘User education’ campaigns are encouraged by the Act, but there is little 
evidence that they are effective with the typical or casual copyright infringer.  
One way of pursuing the objective of reducing the impacts of online 
infringement of copyright may be to carry on with existing campaigns, finding 
                                                
121 (Ofcom, 2010), para 3.15. 
122 (Murtagh, 2009). 
123 (N. Anderson, 2010b). 
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ways to more effectively provide support for education within the framework of 
programmes to enhance digital literacy.  This could embrace many forms of 
digital participation and encourage the excluded population to go online, focusing 
on young people and adults beginning their online experience.124  To conclude 
that narrowly focused copyright education campaigns have failed, suggests that a 
new narrow campaign directed at individuals may also be ineffective.  If the 
issues are placed in the broader context of enabling citizens to fully participate in 
a digital society and consumers to fully access and evaluate the trustworthiness of 
online information, there is a greater likelihood of influencing the intentions and 
behaviours of Internet users. 
 
• Further promotion of legal means by rights holders of acquisition of content, 
combined with greater public recognition by other stakeholders (government, 
ISPs, consumer groups and others) of innovations and improvements in legal 
services is likely to shape the future development of the creative industries in the 
interests of all stakeholders.  Attention to issues of market structure and 
competition in legal downloading markets with the aim of assuring a level of 
competition compatible with innovation and investment in such services will 
continue to be needed. 
 
• The requirement of notifications to users of P2P software. In the US legislation is 
being passed which mandates warnings to users which requires software 
producers to incorporate a message that appears during the installation and use 
of P2P software products. 125 This legislation is intended to prevent inadvertent 
disclosure of information on a computer through P2P file-sharing programmes 
without first providing notice and obtaining consent from an owner or 
authorised user of a computer. These measures are targeted mainly at protecting 
privacy and mitigating security threats from accidental sharing of information, 
but they offer a means through which user education could be enhanced without 
recourse to the intervention of ISPs.  
                                                
124 Ofcom has an ongoing programme of monitoring digital literacy described at 
http://www.imlrf.org/member/ofcom as does the European Commission, described at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/tl/edutra/skills/index_en.htm which is part of the i2010 
strategy aimed at inclusion and e-learning, accessed 1/07/2010. 
125 Senate P2P Cyber Protection and Informed User Act (United States Government, 2010) and House of 
Representatives Informed P2P User Act (United States Government, 2009). 
 43 
 
• The most innovative alternative solutions involve rethinking how digital content 
producers might be compensated for their efforts other than by the direct use of 
market exchange.126  For the most part, these involve taxes applied to the use of 
the Internet or general taxation and mechanisms to allocate the resulting pool of 
resource to individual content providers. 127 While such proposals are sound in 
theory, no practical means of implementing them has been developed as yet. 
 
In addition, alternative approaches noted by the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) in 2010 include the suggestion to consider alternative models of compensation 
for rights holders. 128  If actions are to be taken that involve the identification of 
individual users, the EDPS notes that data protection considerations should limit 
disclosure to individual activities occurring at a commercial scale,129 and that measures 
should not be highly invasive of individual privacy and should respect values such as due 
process and freedom of speech. The EDPS also notes ‘user notification’ as a less 
intrusive means of intervention citing the ‘Citizens Rights Directive’ of 2009130 obligation 
to ensure that rules and procedures to limit small scale copyright infringement by 
consumers are addressed through member states’ obligations to produce “standardised 
public interest information … specifically mentioning infringements of copyright and 
related rights, and their legal consequences.”  
 
4.2 Experience	  of	  Other	  Countries	  
International experience suggests that there are differences in the relationships between 
the increasing availability of high bandwidth to users and the extent of illegal file-sharing. 
There also appear to be differences in the extent to which young people are sharing 
illegal content before or after the implementation of copyright enforcement measures.  
These differences are not surprising given the importance of the cultural, social and 
economic factors highlighted earlier in this report. A variety of approaches to the 
involvement of ISPs in the enforcement of existing (or planned) legislation can be found.  
 
                                                
126 (Mansell & Steinmueller, 2000a), pp. 301-310. 
127 See (Noam & Pupillo, 2008) for a discussion. 
128 (Hustinx, 2010), p. 10, para. 41. 
129 (Hustinx, 2010), p. 11, para. 43. 
130 (European Commission, 2009), para 26. 
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In the United States developments to counter copyright infringements are subject to the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act,131 and, in particular, to Title II of the Act (Liability 
Limitation Act) which involves ISPs insofar as they must reveal the identities of 
suspected infringers, although the courts have found the language in the Act ambiguous 
as to the obligations of ‘carriage ISPs’.  In the US between 2003 and 2005 the RIAA - the 
trade association which represents some 85 per cent of manufacturers or distributors of 
copyrighted music in the US - is reported to have filed 17,000 lawsuits against direct 
infringers. In 2005 there were estimated to be some 5.7 million US households that had 
downloaded an unauthorised song using P2P software at least once. The result of RIAA 
enforcement initiatives within the US has, it is argued, led to charges of censorship and 
damage to innovation and succeeded in shifting file-sharing from a centralised activity to 
a decentralised foreign-based activity,132 suggesting that measures taken in a single 
country may succeed in shifting the main infringing websites to other jurisdictions. 
 
In 2008 it was reported that the numbers of legal suits brought by the RIAA against 
individuals alleged to be engaged in online infringement of copyright using P2P networks 
was in decline or had stopped and that the RIAA was seeking greater cooperation with 
ISPs to deter this behaviour. In the US, some have argued that proposed actions 
involving termination and suspension of Internet connections based “upon mere 
suspicion” could deprive users of lawful content. 133 The Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) in the context of its Internet Policy Statement, has indicated that 
ISP-RIAA collaborations may be disallowed as an ‘extreme form’ of network 
management which risks cutting subscribers off from legitimate content and interferes 
with the principle of network neutrality.134 
 
Internationally, the RIAA campaign to strengthen measures to ensure that copyright 
protection is respected on a global basis and to reduce file-sharing of copyrighted digital 
images and texts is pursued via the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) 
and the national copyright industry associations. In the case of the EU, a 2010 report on 
the EU digital economy claimed that in 2008 the EU’s creative industries contributed 6.9 
per cent, or approximately €860 billion, to total European GDP. The sectors most 
                                                
131 (United States Government, 1998). 
132 (Hambidge, 2007). 
133 (Murtagh, 2009). 
134 (Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 2005) and (Broache, 2008). 
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affected by infringement of copyright (film, television, recorded music and software) 
were estimated to have experienced retail revenue losses of €10 billion. Estimates 
attributable to downloading were based on assumptions made in academic studies and 
are subject to multiple caveats.  The report claimed, nevertheless, that assuming no 
significant policy changes, these industries could expect to see cumulative retail revenue 
losses of as much as €240 billion by 2015.135  However, based on data for 2009, 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) has reported that music 
sales increased in some EU markets including the UK and Sweden,136 suggesting that the 
gains and losses to the creative industries will continue to fluctuate and that reports will 
be based on differing assumptions. 
 
Actions by EU member states aimed at curtailing copyright infringing activity include 
legislation and implementation measures with respect to file-sharing.  These have been 
initiated within the framework established by the 2001 EU Directive on harmonising 
copyright and related rights in the information society.137 Member state legislation is also 
informed by the 2004 EU Directive on intellectual property rights enforcement.138  In 
September 2008, the European Parliament expressed opposition to a ‘three-strikes’ type 
of policy involving notifications to customers by ISPs, indicating that restrictions on the 
fundamental rights and liberties of Internet users, including the right of access to 
information, should not be made without a court decision.  This was discussed by the 
Parliament and the European Commission in the context of the Telecom Reform 
Package leading to a decision in November 2009.139 Concerns arose not only from the 
question of suppressing illegal entertainment content, but also from concerns about 
Internet access controls that might be used in ways that fail to respect the rights and 
freedoms of the citizens of EU member states. These concerns arise not only with 
respect to controlling file-sharing but also in attempts to control violent radical and 
                                                
135 (TERA Consultants & Commerce/BASCAP, 2010). 
136 (N. Anderson, 2010a). 
137 (European Commission, 2001). 
138 (European Commission, 2004). 
139 An ‘Internet Freedom’ provision was incorporated in the Telecom Reform Package as Annex 1, 
Article 1(3)a which makes reference to the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and general principles of Community law (Europa RAPID Press Releases, 2009). 
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pornographic content.140 The role of ISPs in this context continues to be under debate 
within the EU. 141 
 
Our assessment of the experience of other countries is based on a review drawn mainly 
from the trade literature. The introduction of legislation aimed at involving ISPs in the 
bid to curtail infringing file-sharing is relatively recent. As a result there are few academic 
studies of these specific developments and their consequences in countries in different 
regions of the world. We highlight some of the differences in approaches and experience 
that can be gleaned from trade magazines, online newspapers and blogs.  
 
The use of technical methods  
• Differences in the perceived feasibility of using technical filtering systems to 
detect infringing file-sharing activity.	  142 
• Inconclusive discussions about the use of technical systems to block individual 
customer attempts to share copyrighted files over P2P networks. 
• The effectiveness of using warnings delivered to the screens of suspected illicit 
file-sharers or to all users of P2P software is uncertain.143  
Requirements for ISPs to disclose identities of customers accused of infringement 
• Controversy over the privacy implications of disclosing user identities.	  144   
• Debate concerning the negative effects of ISP disclosure on customer trust or 
ISP reputation.	  145 
Differences in whether new legislation has been introduced to tackle file-sharing 
• EU member states are proceeding at different rates and adopting different 
approaches in introducing legislation specifically to address infringing file-
sharing, subsequent to the 2004 EU Directive on anti-piracy matters.	  146 
                                                
140 (Ryan & Heinl, 2010). 
141 (Strowel, 2009). 
142 (Pasche, 2009), a dissertation evaluating the benefits and disbenefits of legal approaches; Japan - 
(P2PNet, 2010). 
143 Finland (Enigmax, 2009). 
144 Germany (Cheng, 2009). 
145 (Enigmax, 2008). 
146 Belgium, 15 May 2007 - Law concerning the punishment of counterfeiting and piracy of intellectual 
property (LPCP): http://www.bordermeasures.com/IMG/pdf/EM.pdf; Denmark - (TorrentFreak, 
2009); Finland - IPRED Law implemented 1 January 2006; France - 12 June 2009 Loi Hadopi, 
http://www.senat.fr/dossierleg/pjl07-405.html; Italy - May 
2004at http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/04128l.htm; Sweden - IPRED law 1 April 2009, 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/11/69/38/c18e5f5a.pdf, all accessed 26 June 2010. 
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• Some countries (e.g. Germany) continue to debate whether there is a need for 
new legislation or whether it is possible to rely upon existing legislation.147	   
 
In the countries that we surveyed, the use of technical methods or ISP disclosure of 
individual user identity continues to be very controversial. 
 
The debate concerning possible measures reveals considerable differences in opinion 
about the need for action or what actions should be taken: 
The approaches of nationally-based creative industry associations  
• Variations in the apparent willingness of the creative industries to charge 
individuals with file-sharing offences.	  148  
• Differences in strategies aimed at flagrant individual illicit file sharers and 
strategies aimed at all potentially infringing file sharers.	  149 
• Debates about whether those allegedly engaged in infringing file-sharing are also 
important paying customers of creative industry firms. 150 
ISP positions 
• Variations in the willingness of ISPs to participate in a ‘graduated approach’ or 
‘three strikes you are out’ plan without being ordered by a court to do so.151  
• Differences in whether ISPs have or have not made statements about whether 
they view disclosure of identity as violating personal data protection legislation.152	   
Public and Media responses 
• Differences in the public response to new measures to curtail illegal file-sharing 
ranging from the formation of a political party (Sweden) to highly visible media 
profiles for social movement groups protesting actions they believe to be targeted 
at online fan communities.	  153 
• Variations in the reported decreases or increases in file-sharing traffic following 
the implementation of new measures.154 
                                                
147 Germany - (FreakBits, 2009). 
148 Denmark - (Techdirt, 2009a); (Freeform101.org, 2009). 
149 (Ou, 2008). 
150 (Mtima, 2009), p. 691; and (Murtagh, 2009). 
151 Canada - (Canada - Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, 2010). 
152 Ireland - (Murtagh, 2009); Italy - (Enigmax, 2010). 
153 France - (Murphy, 2010); (Sage, 2010); Sweden - (Schofield, 2009); Australia - (McLelland, 2010) 
154 Norway - (Molde, 2009); Sweden - (BBC, 2009); (ExtraTorrent.com, 2010); Canada - (Andersen & 
Frenz, nd). 
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• Differences in the media profile given to police raids of the premises of those 
alleged to be engaged in facilitating file-sharing through their websites.	  155 
 
The courts have also exhibited considerable variation in response to legislation that has 
been enacted: 
• Ambiguities as to whether a court will convict an individual offender on the basis 
of a technical identification of an IP address and the technical recognition of files 
or if there is no confession.	  156 
• Variations in whether ISPs have been ordered by the courts to block customer 
access to BitTorrent sites such as The Pirate Bay (based in Sweden) or other sites 
based within EU member states.	  157 
• Reports of absence of action subsequent to the introduction of legislation and 
differing claims about its implementation.158 
• Variations in court rulings on whether ISPs are required to reveal the identities of 
allegedly infringing customers – with or without a specific court order.159 
• Variations in the punishments given to individuals convicted in connection with 
file-sharing sites and infringing file-sharing activities with no punishment to 
suspensions of Internet access for several months up to a year, two years, three 
years, or permanently.	  160	   
• Variations in court decisions as to whether file-sharing of copyrighted content may 
be allowed for non-commercial purposes and when copies can be said to be 
‘degraded’.161 
 
On this basis, while noting that we do not have expertise in the interpretation of the law, 
it appears that the strategy favoured by the UK Government in the Act is not favoured 
throughout the EU or internationally. The trend in policy and legislation is clearly to 
ensure that copyright law is respected, but there is very wide variation in the extent to 
which action is being targeted at individual users of the Internet. These variations are 
indicative of the changing perceptions of appropriate behaviour online as citizens and 
                                                
155 (Libbenga, 2006). 
156 Denmark - (P2Pon!, 2010a). 
157 Denmark - (P2Pon!, 2010a); France - (Wray, 2009). 
158 Sweden - (P2Pon!, 2010b). 
159 Italy - (Vivarelli, 2010); Sweden - (AFP, 2009); (P2Pon!, 2009); Canada - (Geist, 2009). 
160 Finland - (Libbenga, 2006); (IFIP, 2007); Italy - (Smith, 2004); Canada - (Ernesto, 2010a); Japan - 
(Fumijp Blogspot, 2009); South Korea - (ZeroPaid, 2009). 
161 Italy - (Bangeman, 2008). 
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consumers increase their involvement in an online participatory culture that enables them 
to produce and consume digital content in multiple new forms, mixing content from 
many sources and sharing it with those active in their local and global online 
communities. 
 
Some indication of the possible reaction of UK Internet users to the Act’s 
implementation and the spread of the use of BitTorrent to enable the legal P2P 
distribution of digital content is suggested by the following:  
 
• ACS: Law announced that from January 2010 it would bring some 15,000 cases 
against individuals, but then argued that mass law suits may not be the way 
forward.  
• The consumer organisation, Which?, reported complaints from some 150 
individuals claiming that they had wrongly received letters from the law firm.162  
• In 2008 Virgin Media sent warning letters to customers without the threat of 
disconnection from the Internet for allegedly infringing behaviour but has ceased 
this practice. 
• P2P legal applications include the use of open source BitTorrent servers by the 
BBC to enable the public to access content, although after the launch of iPlayer, 
the BBC switched to streaming content from its own servers.163 
• In June 2010 the UK Treasury used BitTorrent to release public data on 
Government spending through its Combined Online Information System 
(COINS) initiative.164 
 
Finally, the RIAA’s own strategy may be changing as the numbers of its suits against 
individuals in the US has declined since a peak in mid-2000s.  Similarly, the Motion 
Picture Association of America (MPAA) is reported to be no longer pursuing individual 
file sharers.165  US law firms are approaching content creators directly to bring law suits 
against alleged infringers of copyright, in the hope of financial settlements. An indication 
of RIAA’s current strategy is the publication of its first list of the top six illegal file-
sharing websites that are used for the global exchange of copyrighted movies, music and 
                                                
162 (ZeroPaid, 2010). 
163 (EBU, 2010). 
164 (Ernesto, 2010b) and see http://data.gov.uk/dataset/coins. 
165 (N. Anderson, 2010b). 
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other works. These were Baidu (China), IsoHunt (Canada), mp3fiesta (Ukraine), 
RapidShare (Germany), RMX4U (Luxemburg) and The Pirate Bay (Sweden).166  This 
suggests a renewed targeting of those firms and associations that support and encourage 
individual infringing file-sharing behaviour. 
 
4.3 Summary	  
We conclude that the current approach mandated by the Act is not proportional in the 
light of the overall weakness of the evidence on the balance between social benefits and 
costs, contradictory evidence about user responses and the rapidly changing online 
participatory culture which is influencing the conditions of Internet use. The creative 
industries are themselves considering a variety of alternative approaches. Alternative 
solutions to file-sharing of copyrighted digital content include: pursing those either 
hosting or facilitating access to large amounts of infringing content; digital literacy 
campaigns aimed at enabling citizens to fully participate in a digital society; promotion of 
legal means for accessing content by rights holders; attention to issues of market 
structure and competition in legal downloading with the aim of assuring a level of 
competition compatible with innovation and investment in such services; notifications to 
users of P2P software; and rethinking how digital content producers might be 
compensated for their efforts.  
 
Our review of the trade literature, based on the recent experience of other EU member 
states and several other countries, indicates that the strategy favoured by the UK 
Government is not one that is favoured throughout the EU or internationally, though we 
do not claim expertise in the interpretation of existing law. Our review indicates that 
there is considerable variation in the approaches being adopted by governments, ISPs 
and the creative industries, and in the impact of measures to curtail infringing behaviour 
on Internet users.  These variations include: differences in the use of technical methods 
to monitor or control infringing behaviour; differences in requirements for ISPs to 
disclose the identities of customers alleged to be infringing; and differences in whether 
new legislation is introduced to tackle file-sharing. In the countries surveyed the use of 
technical methods or ISP disclosure of user identity continues to be very controversial. 
There are differences in the approaches being taken by national creative industry 
associations and ISPs with respect to the adoption of ‘graduated approaches’, varying 
                                                
166 (RIAA, 2010). 
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public and media responses to these initiatives, and inconsistencies in rulings by the 
courts on cases that have been brought before them.  
 
The trend in policy and legislation clearly is to ensure that copyright law is respected, but 
there is wide variation in the extent to which action is being targeted at individual users 
of the Internet.  The mix of developments at national, regional and global levels has 
substantial implications for the creative industry, ISPs, and consumers and citizens, the 
latter being subject to inconsistent conditions, rules, and procedures in different 
countries. In our opinion, these inconsistencies are a source of confusion for many 
Internet users that is likely to retard innovative developments and impede the full 
potential offered by the use of the Internet.  
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